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PROCEDURE
prosecution to produce such photographs. 4 If
"People v. Jackson 299 N.E.2d 142 (Il1. App. 1973).
The victim of a robbery was shown a group of photo-
gaphs seven months after the crime took place. The
vtim picked defendant's picture. Police retained nei-
ther the photographs nor a list of the people pictured
in the photo display. Defendant claimed the lack of
photographs violated his right to due process. While the
court did say that good police procedure and proper
prosecutorial care would require retention of the photo-
graphs, it relied on "the totality of the circumstances"
clause in Simmons, and stated that there was sufficient
bases to believe the victim's in-court identification. The
point remains, however-how can the defendant attack
an in-court identification possibly tainted by a poorly
handied photo display when counsel is not required at
the photographic identification and the absence of the
photographs is not an absolute bar to prosecution? The
result is that the defendant claims his rights have been
violated, and instead of examining the facts of the situa-
tion, the judge makes what is tantamount to a ruling on
the credibility of the claim.
See People v. Camel, 295 N.E.2d 270 (Ill. App.
1973) (failure to furnish defendants with the photo-
graphs shown to the victim of a rape for attempted,
but unsuccessful, photographic identification was not
error when sufficient basis is apparent for the relia-
bility of the in-court identification); cf. People v. New-
bury, 53 Ill. 2d 228, 290 N.E.2d 592 (1972) (defendanL
counsel is not required at the photographic identifi-
cation, and if the State is under no absolute duty
to produce the pictures used, the defendant is left
with no basis from which to launch a due process
attack.
The Supreme Court on June 21, 1973, handed
down a decision in United States v. Ask which pur-
ports to follow the historical line of cases in defining
what is and what is not a critical stage. In actuality,
the opinion is likely to lead to more confusion in
the already muddled area of the right to counsel at
critical stages of a prosecution. In all possibility,
the Court, for the sake of consistency, may find
itself with a Hobson's choice between its own con-
struction and the pre-existing law of both its own
jurisdiction and that of at least one state. In effect,
the decision leaves both the legal scholar and the
legal practitioner wondering where we will go from
here.
need not be granted leave to inspect photographs of




Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973)
In Davis v. United States,' the United States
Supreme Court held-that a federal prisoner's failure
to object before trial to an alledgedly unconstitu-
tional grand jury array constituted a waiver of his
right to raise that objection through a post-con-
viction writ of habeas corpus. Furthermore, under
the circumstances of this case, petitioner had failed
to show sufficient "cause" to warrant relief from
application of the waiver.
A federal grand jury indicted Davis, a Negro,
and two white men for entry into a federally in-
sured bank with intent to commit larceny.2 Peti-
tioner, represented throughout by appointed
counsel was convicted and sentenced to fourteen
years in prison. Almost three years after his con-
viction he flied a motion in the federal district
court to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.3
1411 U.S. 233 (1973).
'A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1948) and § 2113(a)
(1940).
'28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948) provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to
He alleged in his petition that the indictment
against him was invalid because the grand jury
had been selected by the "key man" system.4
Petitioner claimed that this system resulted in
systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand
jury in violation of his rights under federal statutes5
and the Federal Constitution.6 Davis had not
be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution .... may
move the court which imposed sentence to vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence.
The purpose of § 2255 is to provide federal prisoners
with the equivalent relief which habeas corpus provides
state prisoners. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424
(1962); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
Under a "key man" system, jury commissioners
ask persons who are thought to have wide contacts
in the community to supply the names of prospec-
tive jurors.
411 U.S. at 246, n.2, (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1863 (1968). The former section
declares it to be the policy of the United States to as-
sure all litigants the right to a fair grand and petit jury;
the latter section establishes procedures for preventing
discrimination in the selection of the grand and petitjuries.6 U.S. CONST. amend. V:
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previously raised this objection in pretrial, trial
or appellate motion.
The district court denied Davis' motion. It held
that Davis had waived his right to object to the
grand jury's composition under Rule 12(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure7 and that
the facts did not show the requisite "cause" to
warrant relief from the waiver provision of the
Rule. The Court of Appeals affirmed,' and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 9
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a majority
of six justices, affirmed. He began with the premise
that Rule 12(b)(2) applies to § 2255 motions.'0
Rule 12(b)(2) provides that objections to "defects
in the institution of the prosecution or in the in-
dictment" must be raised, (and presumably adju-
dicated), before trial. Clearly the grand jury forms
an integral part of the institution of the prosecu-
tion and the indictment. Objections to the grand
jury array are therefore within the purview of Rule
12(b)(2). Since failure to follow the Rule's proce-
dure constitutes a waiver, one who pleads to an in-
dictment and goes to trial without objection,
waives-any right to object to the grand jury there-
after. Relief from this waiver standard, however,
may be granted for "cause shown." By its terms
the Rule applies to constitutional as well as pro-
cedural defects."
The Court's opinion asserted that Shotwell Mfg.
Co. v. Uniked States12 controlled the instant case.
In Shotwell, the petitioners had been convicted of
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury...
,' FED. R. CRr-. P. 12(b)(2). This Rule provides that:
defenses and objections based on defects in the
institution of the prosecution or in the indict-
ment... may by raised only by motion before
trial
and tht failure to present such defenses or objections
constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court for cause
shown may grant relief from the waiver.
8 455 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969).
' The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the
decision was contrary to two Ninth Circuit decisions,
Chee v. United States, 449 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1971);
and Fernandez v. Meier, 408 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1969).
Both decisions held that when a petitioner in a § 2255
motion alleged facts sufficient to constitute a violation
of his constitutional rights, a hearing must be granted
unless it affirmatively appeared from the record that
he had knowingly waived his right to object.
"0411 U.S. at 237. This assertion really was not
challenged in the dissent. Rather, Justice Marshall
agreed that rule 12(b)(2) applied, but disagreed on
whether "cause" existed to relieve Davis of application
of the waiver provision.11411 U.S. at 236.
12371 U.S. 341 (1963).
federal income tax evasion. Four years later, they
raised a § 2255 motion, contending that the grand
and petit jury arrays had been illegal because the
jury commissioner had failed to utilize a selection
procedure likely to produce a representative cross
section of the community. During a hearing on the
motion, while petitioners conceded that Rule
12(b)(2) applied to their petition they believed
that "cause" for relief from the waiver provision
existed because they had only recently been ap-
prised of the facts supporting the motion. The
Court, however, found that "the facts concerning
the selection of the grand and petit juries were
notorious and available to petitioners in the exer-
cise of due diligence." 11 For this reason and be-
cause the petitioners were not prejudiced by the
alleged illegalities, the Court concluded that there
was insufficient "cause" to warrant relief from the
waiver. Rehnquist concluded that "Shotwell thus
confirms that Rule 12(b)(2) precludes untimely
challenges to grand jury arrays even when the
challenges are on constitutional grounds." 14
Another case involving waiver of a claim raised
in a § 2255 motion arose in Kaufman v. United
States. 5 Kaufman had been convicted of armed
robbery. At trial and on appeal his sole defense
was insanity. Later, he brought a § 2255 motion
alleging an unlawful search and seizure. The Su-
preme Court held that although a § 2255 habeas
corpus petition is not a substitute for appeal, relief
cannot be denied to one alleging a violation of
constitutional rights solely on the ground that he
should have appealed."' The Court did, however,
indicate that relief would be denied to one who
deliberately bypassed orderly procedures in raising
his objection."
Rehnquist distinguished Kaufman because it did
not involve a statutory waiver provision com-
parable to Rule 12(b)(2). Kaufman apparently
had not complied with another procedural rule,
41(e),18 but 41(e) unlike 12(b)(2) does not make
noncompliance a per se waiver. Therefore, be-
cause Rule 41(e) is silent, the Court could properly
apply its own "different standard" 11 of waiver in
13 Id. at 363.
14 411 U.S. at 238.
15 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
16 Id. Accord, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311
(1963); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).
17 394 U.S. at 227, n.8.
18 FED. R. CRm. P. 41(e) provides that a motion to
suppress the use of the evidence obtained in an unlawful
search "shall be made before trial..., but the court in its
discretion xnay entertain the motion at the trial .... "
"9 Although the majority opinion at no point acknowl-
1973] ":-
PROCEDURE
Kaufman. However, when one like Davis, fails to
object before trial to an allegedly unconstitutional
grand jury array, he runs afoul of Rule 12(b)(2).
This latter rule is not silent on the issue of waiver,
but rather mandates that noncompliance is a per
se waiver of the right to later raise the claim. Any
judicial tampering with this legislatively pro-
nounced waiver standard would be improper.20
The majority examined two factors in determin-
ing whether "cause" had been shown to relieve
Davis of the waiver. First, the Court could not
discover any justification for petitioner's failure
to make a timely objection. Davis had not offered
any such justification. The method objected to was
long-practiced and well-known, 21 and there was no
evidence that petitioner was unaware of the use
of the key man system before his trial. Secondly,
Rehnquist could not see how the alleged consti-
tutional violation could have prejudiced the pe-
titioner.2 The same grand jury indicted Davis'
two white accomplices,"3 the case had no racial
overtones, and the government's case against
petitioner was a strong one. The Court thus con-
edges the source of this "different standard" of waiver,
it is clearly that which was enunciated in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938):
An intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.
The Supreme Court has stated that "the classical
definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson furnishes the
controlling standard" for judicial discretion in denying
habeas corpus relief. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
20 411 U.S. at 240.
2 This reason was based upon the apparent analogy
with Shotwel. But the similarity between the cases is
superficial. The alleged illegalities in the jury system in
Shotwell were not as basic as the racial exclusion alleged
by Davis. In Shotwel petitioners did not allege that
they had been ignorant of their rights at the proper
time for objection, but that they had been unaware of
certain facts supporting their claim. In Shotwell peti-
tioners were granted a hearing on their motion; in
Davis the district court denied the motion without a
hearing, ruling only on the petition, the records and the
additional briefs on waiver. In ShotweUdl the defendants
were corporate executives represented by retained
counsel; Davis was indigent and represented by ap-
pointed counsel.
2 Rehnquist asserted that ShotweUl approved con-
sideration of prejudice to a petitioner in determining
whether relief from the waiver provision was warranted.
411 U.S. at 244. He concluded:
The presumption of prejudice which supports the
existence of the right is not inconsistent with a
holding that actual prejudice must be shown in
order to obtain relief from a statutorily provided
waiver for failure to assert it in a timely manner.
411 U.S. at 245, (Rehnquist, J., citing Peters v. Kiff, 407
US. 493 (1972)).
1 This allegedly shows that even if there were a viola-
tion of Davis' constitutional rights, this violation was
not prejudicial.
cluded that "cause" had not been shown to warrant
relief from the waiver provision.24
The Court also discussed a policy reason for
strict enforcement of Rule 12(b)(2). It argued that
if the courts allowed defendants to disregard
legislatively pronounced procedures, defendants
would be encouraged to bypass those procedure,
for tactical advantages. A defendant, aware of
both a valid constitutional objection and the
proper procedure for raising it, might, nevertheless,
withhold the objection, hoping that it might pro-
vide grounds in a habeas corpus proceeding to
upset a possible conviction. The Court claimed
that the costs to society in allowing such a de-
fendant that choice were too great. It maintained
that procedural rules like 12(b)(2) do not deprive
defendants of their right to raise constitutional
objections, but merely require that they be raised
and adjudicated before the government incurs the
expense of a possible illegal trial.25
Mr. justice Marshall wrote the dissenting opin-
ion in which Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice
Brennan concurred. The dissenters immediately
asserted that in light of the purposes served by
Rule 12(b)(2) and the modern scop6 and purposes
served by habeas corpus relief,28 a prisoner claim-
ing that his constitutional rights have been vio-
lated, should be granted a hearing if he shows that
his failure to make a timely objection was not an
effective waiver.
Marshall rejected the majority's distinction of
Kaufman. 7 That case involved Rule 41(e) of the
24411 U.S. at 244.
26 Id. at 241.21 In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Supreme
Court held that a state prisoner's failure to meet state
procedural requirements for appealing his constitutional
objection did not bar a federal habeas corpus hearing.
Under the circumstances, Noia had not made an intel-
ligent and understanding waiver to justify withholding
federal habeas corpus relief. The Court, however,
cautioned that an applicant who deliberately bypassed
state judicial remedies could be denied relief on the
grounds of an implied waiver. In Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the Court considered the
problem of waiver in a federal prisoner's petition for
habeas corpus under § 2255. Under the circumstances
the Court could not find a waiver. It held that a peti-
tioner who alleges facts sufficient to support his claim
for relief must be granted a hearing on his motion, un-
less the motions and the records of the case "con-
clusively show that the claim is without merit." Re-
garding strict adherence to procedural rules, the Court
said:
Conventional notions of finality of litigation have
no place where life or liberty is at stake and in-
fringement of constitutional rights is alleged.
Id. at 8.
27 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing
the timeliness of constitutional objections to the
use of certain evidence.28 He believed that Rule
41(e) like Rule 12(b)(2) required that certain
motions be made at specified times, and failure to
do so may be excused for cause. The purpose of
Rule 41(e) is similar to the purposes of Rule
12(b)(2), and the absence of an explicit waiver
provion should not control the validity of a § 2255
motion."
The dissenters did, on the other hand, distin-
guish Shotwell. There, petitioners contended not
that they had been unaware of their right to be
indicted by a representative grand jury, but that
the facts supporting their objection had not come
to their attention until four years after their trial.
The Court found, however, that these facts were
well-known, even "notorious," before petitioners'
trial. Hence, due diligence on theirpartwould have
made petitioners aware of the facts at the proper
time for raising the objection. Marshall agreed
with the Shoiwell Court that one who fails to
exercise due diligence to discover evidence sup-
porting a known claim, has waived his right to
later raise that claim.10 Here, however, Davis had
been represented by appointed counsel and he
alleged solely that he had not waived his right to
object. Davis, compared to Shotwell, presented a
much more serious situation, and Marshall be-
lieved Davis should be granted a hearing for the
opportunity to prove his claim.
The dissent pointed out that the majority did
not urge strong policy reasons for their holding.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist gave only cursory attention
to one policy ground, preventing tactical evasion
of procedures by defendants. Marshall did not
find this reason compelling. First, such tactics
need not impose tremendous judicial costs upon
society, as the majority opinion suggested. If, after
a trial was completed, a habeas corpus hearing
determined that the array of the indicting grand
jury was unconstitutional, it would only be neces-
28 See note 18 supra.20 Marshall said:
I had not thought that words were quite so magical
as that distinction makes them.
411 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 256.
31 The dissent did not claim that Davis was unaware
of his right to be indicted by a kepresentative grandjury, but this is clearly the problem which they sus-
pected. Although it may be proper to expect a defendant
to be aware of common facts which might support a
known constitutional right, it probably is less accept-
able to expect a defendant to be aware of all of his con-
stitutional rights.
sary to convene a proper grand jury. This cost
would be incurred even if the question were re-
solved at a pre-trial hearing according to Rule
12(b)(2). Then, if a proper grand jury nevertheless
indicted the petitioner, a re-trial could be con-
ducted largely upon the testimony of the first
trial, and thus the costs minimized.n Secondly, a
flexible application of Rule 12(b)(2) need not
result in the tactical abuse which the majority
feared. If a hearing reveals that tactical advantage
is the purpose of a petitioner's failure to timely
object, then relief should be denied.3
The dissenting Justices believed that more im-
portant policy considerations militate for a flexible
application of Rule 12(b)(2). An open system of
collateral relief, especially habeas corpus, insures
a fairer criminal justice system, by providing
periodic checks against unconstitutional abuses.
It assures that constitutional rights have a greater
chance of being protected. It probably makes
prisoners more amenable to rehabilitation since
they know that they have a fair opportunity to
raise valid claims 4 Finally, and most importantly,
broad collateral opportunities for remedying con-
stitutional violations may not only be desirable
but in fact constitutionally mandated."5
The dissent concluded that although Rule
12(b)(2) applied to Davis' motion, the petitioner
was entitled to a hearing to show te requisite
"cause" to warrant relief from the waiver. Mar-
shall's interpretation of "cause" included failure
to make a timely objection because of ignorance
or misunderstanding of the procedural rule. John-
son v. Zerbs$ 6 had declared that knowledge and
understanding were necessary elements of a valid
waiver. This "different standard" as the majority
called it, need not subvert the purposes of a pro-
cedural rule like 12(b)(2). Marshall believed that
absolutely no social interests are promoted by
foreclosing judicial avenues of recourse to one who
is ignorant of his rights.1
Davis may be less significant for its holding,
than for the atmosphere of the Court revealed in
the dicta of the opinions. The holding was quite
narrow: under the circumstances of this case, pe-
titioner failed to show "cause" to be relieved of the
2411 U. S. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"Id.
34 Id. at 253.
3'1d. at 254, n.10. (Marshall, J., citing Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 406; and Sanders v. United States, 373U.S . 13 11-12.).
36 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
411 U.S. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1973]
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waiver provision as required by Rule 12(b)(2). The
majority held that the facts known to the district
court were sufficient to conclude that "cause" was
not present. The dissent believed that despite the
apparent facts, Davis, having alleged deprivation
of a constitutional right and having claimed that
he had not waived his right to object to the grand
jury array, should have been granted a hearing at
which he might have shown "cause." 38
The opinions may, however, indicate a new
majority attitude toward waiver of constitutional
rights. Justice Rehnquist suggested that waivers
may have two bases, legislative or judicial. When
the legislature establishes a waiver standard such
as Rule 12(b)(2), the Courts may not apply an-
other standard.39 Justice Marshall, on the other
hand, discussed the judicial standard of waiver as
8 Id. at 255.
" See text accompanying note 20 supra.
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972)
In Murch v. Moltram,' the Supreme Court ruled
that a subjective test could not be used to deter-
mine if a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus
bad knowingly by-passed state appellate remedies.
After being convicted of larceny and as a habit-
ual offender,2 Mottram was paroled in 1963. Pa-
role, however, was revoked two years later. At
the hearing on parole revocation, the state judge
warned Mottram and his retained counsel that
under Maine law,3 Mottram would irrevocably
waive his right to appeal any issues not raised at
that hearing. After consulting with his client,
Mottram's counsel chose to argue only that the
revocation of parole was invalid. No issues con-
cerning the original conviction were raised.
When the attack on the parole revocation failed, 4
Mottram petitioned the federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus on an issue never before
raised-that the jury in his original trial was se-
1409 U.S. 41 (1972).
2 Mottram failed in an appeal based on issues other
than the one raised eventually in his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325,
184 A.2d 225 (1962).
aME. REv. STAT. Aim. ch. 14, § 5507 (1963):
All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner under
this remedy must be raised by a petitioner in his
original or amended petition, and any grounds not
so raised are waived ....
' Mottram v. State, 232 A.2d 809 (Me. 1967).
a minimum test which any legislative waiver pro-
vision must meet at least when it is a constitu-
tional right that has allegedly been waived. 40
However, Davis was not determined on this issue,
and it is unwise to attempt to predict what these
same justices might decide if the issue of a consti-
tutional minimum standard of waiver were more
directly and deliberately presented to the Court.
The most certain effect of Davis is that in the
future, prisoners who wish to raise collateral ob-
jections should be well prepared to show the courts
that dubious past conduct did not constitute a
waiver of the right to raise the objection. Davis
does not imply that the courthouse doors are
being closed to meritorious petitions for habeas
corpus, but rather, that petitioners (and. counsel)
will have to carry better prepared credentials to
get through those doors.
40 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
lected by unconstitutional means. The district
court determined that Mottram had been specifi-
cally warned by the state judge that he was waiving
future appeals and that Mottram, a man of at
least average intelligence, conferred with a com-
petent lawyer before making his decision. Because
Mottram was "fully aware of these consequences,"
the district court denied his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.5
In a per curian decision, the Supreme Court
held that the petition for habeas corpus had been
properly denied. The Court based its decision on
Fay v. Noia,6 which held that
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with com-
petent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and
knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to
vindicate his federal claims in the state courts,
whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons
that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-
passing of state procedures, then it is open to the
federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the
state courts refused to entertain his federal claims
on the meritsY
5 Mottram v. Murch, 330 F. Supp. 51, 57 (S.D. Me.
1971).
6372 U.S. 391 (1963). Noia is one of three cases which
greatly broadened the availability of habeas corpus.
See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
7372 U.S. at 439. Noia incorporated the previous
(Vol. 64
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The Supreme Court accepted the district court's
findings that, based on objective evidence, Mot-
tram had knowingly by-passed the .appeal proce-
dures of the State of Maine. According to Noia,
therefore, Mottram was not entitled to federal.
relief through a writ of habeas corpus.
The Court refused to consider the subjective
evidence provided by Mottram's self-serving testi-
mony before the district court in which he claimed
to have been unaware that he was by-passing
state procedures. Because Mottram's counsel had
died before the hearing, it was impossible to cor-
roborate Mottram's testimony or to discover why
his counsel had not raised all possible issues of
appeal when challenged by the state judge.8 The
Court reasoned that to allow the consideration of
such subjective evidence would make state en-
forcement of post-conviction procedures impos-
sible.' A state prisoner could purposefully ignore
state appeals procedure and petition immediately
for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, claim-
ing that he had not understood he had waived his
right to further appeals. To safeguard the integ-
rity of state post-conviction procedures, the Su-
preme Court endorsed the objective findings of the
district court.
The Court also noted that the Maine statute
served a legitimate state interest by avoiding a
fragmented appeals procedure whereby prisoners
continuously could write new appeals after the
previous appeals failed. In a past case, the Supreme
Court had decided that a prisoner's right to federal
relief cannot be waived by by-passing state proce-
dures which are frivolous or harassing. °
standard on waiver that denial of habeas corpus was
possible only by "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
8 In some waiver cases, an issue absent here arises
over the relationship between a client and his lawyer.
See White, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Impact of the
Failure to Assert a Constitutional Claim at Trial, 58
VA. L. REv. 67 (1972).
9 409 U.S. at 46:
If a subjective determination not to waive or to
abandon a claim were sufficient to preclude a
finding of a deliberate by-pass of orderly state pro-
cedures, constitutionally valid procedural require-
ments, such as those contained in the Maine statute
requiring the joining of all bases for attack in one
proceeding, would be utterly meaningless.10 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965).
Rather than writing a separate opinion, the dis-
sent in Mottram relied entirely on the holding of
the court of appealsu which had reversed the dis-
trict court. The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit gave credence to Mottram's subjective
testimony that he did not realize he was waiving
future appeals. The court also gave weight to the
disagreement between Mottram's lawyer and the
state judge over the effect of the Maine post-
conviction statute. If Mottram's lawyer was un-
sure of Maine's law on waiver, then Mottram
could not have knowingly by-passed state appeals
procedure.
The effect of Mottram is to quash the attempt
of the First Circuit to introduce a subjective test
into the well-established rule that relief by habeas
corpus can be denied to a prisoner who consciously
circumvents state appeal proceduresj2 Mottran;
can also be viewed as part of a recent policy on
the part of the Supreme Court to stop the trend
toward the broadening of habeas corpus as a
remedy for defects in state criminal procedure.13
In the recent case of Davis v. United States,34 the
majority limited the rights of federal prisoners to
writs of habeas corpus. The Court strictly inter-
preted Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to the effect that a failure to
raise before trial any errors in the indictment
process permanently waives the right to seek relief
on the basis of those errors. Both Mottram and
Davis serve to insure that "jailhouse lawyers" do
not barrage the federal courts with one appeal
after another. The fact that the dissent in Mott-
ram was composed of the same justices as in
Davis5 is further evidence that the progressive
growth of habeas corpus as the ultimate protection
of the constitutional rights of state prisoners has
ended.
1 Mottranm v. Murch, 458 F.2d 626 (Ist Cir. 1972).
12 Mottram is more lenient than the Third Circuit
which held that a state prisoner lost his right to petition
for habeas corpus even when he had not been specifically
warned by the state judge. United States ex rel. Bolog-
nese v. Brierly, 412 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1969).
"See LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690 (1973).
14 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
15 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas.
1973]
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LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690 (1973)
In LaVallee v. Dele Rose,' the Supreme Court
dealt with the question of when a district court may
hold an evidentiary hearing upon a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to determine if a state court
properly applied constitutional standards in mak-
ing a factual determination.
The respondent was convicted in 1963 of the
murder of his wife. Two confessions made by
Delle Rose were admitted in evidence and con-
sidered by the jury. On appeal, the trial court was
directed to hold a hearing on the question of
whether the confessions were voluntarily made.2
Testifying at the special hearing, Delle Rose
alleged that he was interrogated without rest all
night, that he was not warned of his constitutional
rights, that he was threatened with physical abuse
and that he was subjected to macabre indignities.'
Delle Rose spoke little English and claimed to
have been suffering from a back injury during the
interrogation. The state's evidence contradicted
most of this testimony. The trial court ruled that
Delle Rose's confession was voluntary and the
New York Court of Appeals confirmed his con-
viction.
4
Respondent Delle Rose then petitioned the
United States district court for a writ of habeas
corpus,5 alleging in his petition that his federal
constitutional rights had been violated by the ad-
mission in evidence of an involuntary confession.
The district court ruled that an evidentiary hear-
ing was necessary because it was unclear from the
record whether the trial court had erred in apply-
ing constitutional law to the issue of voluntari-
ness.
6
1410 U.S. 690 (1973).
2 Subsequent to the trial, the Supreme Court ruled in
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), that the judicial
body considering the question of guilt or innocence
may not also decide whether a confession was volun-
tary. The New York procedural response to this ruling
was People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72,225 N.Y.S.2d 838,
204 N.E.2d 179 (1965). In accordance with this new
development, Delle Rose was given a special hearing to
determine voluntariness.
3The respondent made his first confession after
viewing his wife's dead body at the morgue. Respondent
was also forced to stick his hand through a hole in a car
seat which was still wet with his wife's blood.
People v. Delle Rose, 27 N.Y.2d 882, 317 N.Y.S.2d
358 265 N.E.2d 770 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 913
(191).
6 United States ex rel. Delle Rose v. LaVallee, 342 F.
Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
6 At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the
district court found that both confessions were in-
voluntary. Id. at 574. The court of appeals affirmed
In a per curian decision, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that where the allegations of
coercion are blatant constitutional violations, the
fact that the state court declared the confessions
voluntary means that the court disbelieved the
defendant's claims and properly applied constitu-
tional standards, even though these standards were
not explicitly discussed. Since the constitutional
rights of the respondent were implicitly considered
by the state court, the district court need not
hold an evidentiary hearing.
In deciding whether a confession is voluntary, a
state court must combine questions of fact and
law. The court must first sort out the allegations
made to determine exactly what pressures, if any,
were applied to the suspect in order to make him
confess. After deciding upon the facts, the court
must then consider the facts in light of prevailing
constitutional law to determine if the confession
was voluntary in a constitutional sense.7 In the
instant case the state court concluded that the
confessions were voluntary,' but the court failed
to explain what constitutional standards it applied
in reaching this conclusion. Thus the court's deter-
mination of the voluntary nature of the confession
could have concealed a mistaken application of
constitutional law.
The Supreme Court's decision in Dele Rose
interpreted Townsend v. Sain,9 a Warren Court
decision which established guidelines for district
courts to follow in determining when evidentiary
hearings need be held.'0 The Court reasoned that
both the need for an evidentiary hearing and the finding
of fact. United States ex rel. Delle Rose v. LaVallee,
468 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1972).7 Because Miranda v.- Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
was not applied retroactively, previous federal case law
governs the question of voluntariness in Ddle Rose.
There is no single guideline on the subject, but rather a
host of cases setting forth criteria in specific types of
coercion. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199(1960) (irrational mental state of the suspect); Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (deception); Ashcroft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (long interrogations);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (physical
abuse).
8 410 U.S. at 691:
On all the evidence, both at the trial and at the
hearing, and after considering the totality of the
circumstances, including the omissionto..war.de-
fendant of his right to counsel and his right against
self-incrimination, I find and decide that the respec-
tive confessions to the police and district attorney
were, in all respects, voluntary and legally admissi-
ble in evidence at the trial ....
9 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
10 Id. at 313:
[Vol. 64
SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1973)
according to Townsend, the state court should be
presumed to have correctly applied constitutional
standards in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary." More specifically, the Court explained
in Townsend that:
[1]f third-degree methods of obtaining a confession
are alleged and the state court refused to exclude
the confession from evidence, the district judge
may assume that the state trier found the facts
against the petitioner, the law being, of course,
that third-degree methods necessarily produce a
coerced confession."
The Supreme Court felt that the instant case
was one in which it should be presumed that the
state court had properly applied federal consti-
tutional standards, even though they were not
articulated. The Court reasoned that because the
coercion alleged by Delle Rose was so obviously
unconstitutional, in order to conclude that the
confessions were voluntary the state court must
have thought that his allegations were false. Had
the state court thought the allegations true, it
certainly would have declared the confessions in-
voluntary. Therefore, the fact that constitutional
standards can be easily applied to the facts in the
instant case allows the presumption that the state
court properly applied these standards, thus ob-
viating the need for an evidentiary hearing by the
district court.
The point of disagreement made by Mr. Justice
Marshall, writing for the dissent,13 is that the facts
in this case are not comparable to the blatant case
We hold that a federal court must grant an evi-
dentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under the
following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the
factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not
fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court
was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly dis-
covered evidence; (5) the material facts were not
adequately developed at the state-court
hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the
state trier of fact did not afford the habeas appli-
cant a full and fair fact hearing.
For a comparison between the Townsend guidelines and
their codification in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1966), see
Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus,
83 LAav. L. Rzv. 1038, 1141 (1970).
11372 U.S. at 314-315:
[W]e think the district judge may, in the ordinary
case in which there has been no articulation, prop-
erly assume that the state trier of fact applied cor-
rect standards of federal law to the facts, in the
absence of evidence... that there is reason to sus-
pect that an incorrect standard was in fact applied.
n Id. at 315.
' Three of the dissenters in Ddle Rose served on the
Court that decided Townsend (justices Douglas, Bren-
of coercive third-degree tactics referred to in
Townsend. Rather than being a case in which ob-
viously unconstitutional pressures are alleged,
Delle Rose involves a complex factual situation
which raises both subtle and difficult constitutional
questions. Instead of claiming common third-
degree interrogation tactics, the allegations of
Delle Rose show a weakened physical and mental
condition, threats of physical abuse, and gruesome
psychological pressures. The dissent argued vigor-
ously that the decision in Townsend would be
perverted if the district court accepted the state
court's factual determination in such a complex
case when the state court had failed to explain its
reasoning as to the difficult constitutional ques-
tions involved. 14 The state court might have be-
lieved some part of the respondent's- story, yet
have incorrectly thought that the type of coercion
involved was not unconstitutional. 5 To insure
that the state prisoner is not being held in viola-
tion of his constitutional rights, the dissent con-
cluded that the district court acted properly in
holding an evidentiary hearing to determine
voluntariness.
The effect of Delle Rose is to check the trend
toward broadening the rights of state prisoners in
federal habeas corpus suits. Since a series of de-
cisions on habeas corpus were handed down by the
Warren Court in 1963,1 the number of habeas
corpus petitions has soared. 7 One purpose of 28
U.S.C. § 2254 was to decrease the number of hear-
ings held under habeas petitions by encouraging
state courts to elaborate their legal reasoning be-
hind factual determinations involving constitu-
tional rights. 8 Whether Delle Rose will serve to
reduce the number of hearings granted is unclear.
nan, and Stewart). Of the majority in Delle Rose, only
Mr. Justice White was involved in Townsend.
"4 Townsend also contains language supporting the
dissent's view that the state court's presumption of
correctness is limited:
The federal court cannot exclude the possibility
that the trial judge believed facts which showed a
deprivation of constitutional rights and yet (er-
roneously) concluded that relief should be denied.
Under these circumstances it is impossible for the
federal court to reconstruct the facts, and a hearing
must be held.
372 U.S. at 315-16.
" See note 7 supra.
'6 Townsend v. Sain, supra note 9; Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391(1963).
17 The number of habeas corpus petitions from state
prisoners has increased from 2,106 in 1963 to 9,063 in
1970. 1970 AzUAI. REPORTO THE DRxcRYoia or TnE
ADamTSRAnVE OFFICE oF TIM UNITED STATES
CouRTs 121.18 S. REP. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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However, in cases where complex fact situations
raise subtle constitutional questions which are
not articulated by the state courts, district courts
will probably be more likely to accept state court
determinations without holding an evidentiary
Speedy Trial:
Strunk v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2260 (1973)
In Strunk v. United States,' the Supreme Court
firmly established that the only constitutionally
permissible remedy for a violation of the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial is to set aside
the conviction and to dismiss the charges.
The petitioner was convicted on federal charges
and sentenced to five years in prison after his pre-
trial motion to dismiss the charges for a violation
of his right to a speedy trial was denied. In revers-
ing the district court's holding on this issue, the
court of appeals held that the ten month delay in
trying Strunk was not justified by the claim that
the government lacked sufficient personnel to pro-
ceed more expeditiously, or the fact that the peti-
tioner was already in jail on other charges and
had confessed his guilt to the current charges. The
court also concluded that the delay could not be
solely attributed to the petitioner because he
notified the government that he intended to pro-
ceed under Rule 20.2 In determining what remedy
should be applied in this case, the court of appeals
noted that the traditional remedy for a sixth
amendment violation of the right to a speedy
trial was dismissal of the charges, but concluded
that this result was too severe since the petitioner's
guilt was not questioned. Instead the court elected
to reduce the petitioner's sentence by the amount
of time occasioned by the illegal delay.3 In so hold-
' 93 S. Ct. 2260 (1973).
2 FED. R. Cxrs. P. 20:
(a) Indictment or Information Pending. A defend-
ant arrested or held in a district other than that in
which the indictment or information is pending
against him may state in writing that he wishes to
plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive trial in the
district in which the indictment or information is
pending and to consent to disposition of the case in
the district in which he was arrested or is held ....
3 United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969, 973 (7th
Cir. 1972). The court reasoned as follows:
The remedy for a violation of this constitutional
right has traditionally been the dismissal of the
indictment or the vacation of the sentence. Perhaps
the severity of that remedy has caused courts to be
extremely hesitant in finding a failure to afford a
hearing. Consequently, another result of Delle
Rose may be increased laxness by state courts in
explicating their legal analysis since the likelihood
of de .novo hearings on the federal level has been
decreased.
ing, the appellate court apparently relied on
Barker v. Wingo,4 which it characterized as estab-
lishing flexible standards based on practical con-
siderations in analyzing violations of the right to
a speedy trial.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the govern-
ment did not appeal the finding that petitioner was
deprived of a speedy trial under the sixth amend-
ment. Thus the only issue confronting the Court
was whether or not the remedy fashioned by the
court of appeals was adequate. In discussing the
appellate court's reliance on Barker, Chief justice
Burger, writing for a unanimous court in Strunk,
noted that the application of flexible standards
discussed in Barker related to the question of
whether the right had in fact been infringfd, not
to the issue of what remedy should be applied
once a violation was found. 5 Furthermore, Mr.
Justice Powell in Barker expressly concluded that
a violation of the right to a speedy trial could only
have one result, the dismissal of the indictment.6
speedy trial. Be that as it may, we know of no rea-
son why less drastic relief may not be granted in
appropriate cases. Here no question is raised about
the sufficiency of the evidence showing defendant's
guilt, and, as we have said, he makes no claim of
having been prejudiced in presenting his defense.
In these circumstances, the vacation of the sentence
and a dismissal of the indictment would seem inap-
propriate. Rather, we think the proper remedy is to
remand the case to the district court with direction
to enter an order instructing the Attorney General
to credit the defendant with the period of time
elapsing between the return of the indictment and
the date of the arraignment.
4 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
593 S. Ct. at 2263.
6 407 U.S. at 522 (footnote omitted):
The amorphous quality of the right also leads to the
unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the
indictment when the right has been deprived. This
is indeed a serious consequence because it means
that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious
crime will go free, without having been tried. Such
a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule
or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only pos-
sible remedy.
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The rationale for the imposition of such a severe
remedy is rooted in the nature of the right. The
purpose of the sixth amendment guarantee to a
speedy trial is to avoid subjecting an accused to
the emotional stress of facing trial for a long period
of time, the loss of family and work ties during
this period if he is incarcerated, or in the case of
an accused already serving a sentence, to preserve
the opportunity of serving a concurrent sentence
and his prospects for rehabilitation Thus, as
Chief Justice Burger noted, the denial of the right
to a speedy trial, unlike other sixth amendment
guarantees such as the right to a public trial, to
an impartial jury or to notice of charges, cannot
be cured by a subsequent trial.8
In virtually all prior cases where a deprivation
of the right to a speedy trial was found, the remedy
applied was dismissal of the charges or vacation
of the sentence. 9 Thus, Strunk appears to add
little to the law in this area. However, its sig-
nificance may lie in clarifying what was largely
assumed, since no previous case has held that dis-
missal is the only possible remedy. This clarifica-
tion takes on added significance in light of the
congested state of the courts today and the serious
backlog of criminal cases,10, and the consequent
increase in the number of defendants pressing the
issue of deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.
It has been suggested by commentators,"2 and the
temptation to the courts has no doubt been great,
that alternative remedies to dismissal could be
applied to cope with the problem of increasingly
delayed criminal trials without sacrificing society's
interest in seeing that those accused of crime are
tried. However, Strunk now makes it clear that
7 93 S. Ct. at 2263.
8Id.
' See, e.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970);
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Arrant v. Wain-
wright, 468 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Rucker, 464 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Dunn, 459 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Ward v. United
States, 346 F.2d 423 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Williams v.
United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
10 As of June 30, 1970, more than 6,000 federal dis-
trict court criminal cases (30o of all pending cases) had
been awaiting trial for one year or more. JUDIcIL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, DnECToR oF THE
Ainm=RAVE Orricx or THE CouRTs, ANNUAL
REPORT 1970, at 155-57 (1971).
n A review of the reporters shows that the numberof
federal cases alone where a defendant has raised the
issue of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial has
substantially more than doubled in the past ten years
over the volume in the previous twenty.
1 Comment, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57
CoLum. L. REV. 846, 866-67 (1957); Note, 64 YALE L.
J. 1208, 1211 n.20 (1955).
no such practical considerations can bear on the
preservation of this constitutional right. through
the remedy of dismissal.
Another factor which has in the past left the
question of a remedy in some doubt is the fact
that many states have statutory requirements for
a speedy trial,"3 which do not necessarily incor-
porate constitutional standards and therefore may
apply alternate remedies without running afoul of
the sixth amendment. In addition, many of the
federal speedy trial cases have been decided on a
motion to dismiss under Rule 48(b)" for want of
prosecution, a standard which, again, does not
necessarily equate with the deprivation, of the
right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment.L'
Even where statutory dismissal was founded on a
sixth amendment violation, the fact that the
remedy was statutorily defined meant that these
cases gave no real guidance as to what remedy
was constitutionally required. 6 Thus, until Strunk,
it has never been entirely clear that the constitu-
tional right itself requires dismissal.
The dear implication of the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Strunk is that the defendant cannot
be retried on remand since the charges must be
dismissed. However, the possibility that, the gov-
ernment could re-indict the defendant if the stat-
ute of limitations has not expired still may exist.
The general rule is that jeopardy does not attach
after a reversal for legal error,'7 including error of
"See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE- § 1382 (West 1970);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-05 (1970); IowA ConE
ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1972); NEv. REv. STAT. § 178.556
(1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-51-6 (1953); WAsH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 10.46.010 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
971.10 (1971).
1" FED. R. Cam. P. 48(b):
Rule 48. Dismissal
(b) By Court. If there is unnecessary delay in
presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an
information against a defendant who has been
held to answer to the district court, or if there is un-
necessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the
court may dismiss the indictment, information or
complaint.
"5Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (case dismissed for want of prosecutionpending
government search for missing evidence, could be re-
initiated without violating defendant's constitutional
right to a speedy trial).
"6E.g., United States v. Perry, 353 F. Supp. 1235
(D.D.C. 1973); United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp.
230 (N.D. Ill. 1955); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D.
183 (D. Md. 1955).
1' United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 473-74




constitutional dimension. However, the real issue
here is not whether jeopardy has attached, but
whether re-indictment and re-trial would be con-
sistent with securing the right of the accused to a
speedy trial.
It has been held that no denial of the right occurs
due to delay involved in 're-trying a defendant
after a reversal of his conviction for error.18 And,
in United States v. Ewell,19 the Supreme Court held
that no deprivation of the right to a speedy trial
occurred where a defendant's conviction was set
aside because of a defective indictment, and the
defendant was subsequently re-indicted within the
applicable period of the statute. However, this
case is distinguishable from the situation in Strunk
where the original error requiring dismissal was the
denial of a speedy trial. Even though the total
delay could be the same in both cases, in one it
would be the result of an orderly judicial process
and in the other the result of the accused having
been denied a constitutional right to a prompt
trial.
The American Bar Association has taken the
position that dismissal following a violation of the
right to a speedy trial should operate as an abso-
lute discharge, 20 and the rationale for this result
has been aptly stated by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Mann v. United
States:
We accept appellant's premise that the constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial is properly enforced
by dismissal of the charge when there has been
prejudicial delay in bring (sic) the case to trial.
... We also agree that a dismissal based on a find-
ing that the constitutional right to a speedy trial
has been denied bars all further prosecution of the
accused for the same offense. While there appears
to be no express articulation of this rule in the
reported decisions, it is the unspoken premise of
all the cases involving the Speedy Trial Clause.
It is, moreover, a necessary rule if the Constitu-
tional Guarantee is not to be washed away in the
18 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 124 (1966);
United States v. Mills, 434 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971).
"1383 U.S. at 122.
"ABA PRojEcT oN Mnmmm STANDARDS FOR
CRUIuu. JUsTIcE, STANaRDs RELATING TO SPEDY
TRI, AIPROVED DRAFT, 1968, at 1:
4.1 Absolute discharge. If a defendant is not
brought to trial before the running of the time for
trial, as extended by excluded periods, the conse-
quence should be absolute discharge. Such dis-
charge should forever bar prosecution for the of-
fense charged and for any other offenses required
to be joined with that offense.
dirty water of the first prosecution, leaving the
government free to begin anew with clean hands.2'
Again, while the Court in Strunk does not ex-
pressly bar any future prosecution, the Court's
concern over the seriousness of the remedy of dis-
missal and its observation that dismissal means in
practice that a guilty defendant may go untried,
22
suggests that this result was assumed.
The consequence of Strunk will be to focus
attention on the criteria for assessing whether or
not a defendant has been deprived of the right to
a speedy trial. The Supreme Court, in Barker v.
Wingo,2" made an attempt to set out standards
for making this judgment through the use of a
balancing test, setting off society's interests
against harm to the accused .2 But much critical
comment has been lodged against this test which
is largely subjective and difficult to apply.2 Both
the limitations of the Barker test and Mr. Chief
justice Burger's apparent dissatisfaction with the
government's failure to appeal the issue of whether
the petitioner was denied a speedy trial in Strunk,
2
may well suggest that the nature of the right will
receive further definition in the foreseeable future.
21304 F.2d 394, 396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (footnotes
omitted).
22 93 S. Ct. at 2263.
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
24 Id. at 529-30 (footnotes omitted):
We, therefore, reject both of the inflexible ap-
proaches-the fixed-time period because it goes
further than the Constitution requires; the de-
mand-waiver rule because it is insensitive to a right
which we have deemed fundamental. The approach
we accept is a balancing test, in which the conduct
of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed.
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to
approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We
can do little more than identify some of the factors
which courts should assess in determining whether
a particular defendant has been deprived of his right.
Though some might express them in different ways,
we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the
reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
2" See, e.g., Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial
gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 Cowum. L. Rxv. 1376 (1972); The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAv. L. REv. 164 (1972);
Comment, Constitutional Law-Standards for the Right
to Speedy Trial, 51 N.C.L. REv. 310 (1972); Comment,
Criminal Procedure-The Right to Speedy Trial, 40
TENN. L. Rv. 104 (1972); Comment, Constitutional
Law-Right to Speedy Trial, 26 VA~N. L. Rv. 171
(1973).
2" Mr. Chief Justice Burger was not entirely content
to limit his consideration to the question of the appro-
priate remedy, and devoted part I of his opinion to
review the facts involved in the delay. He notes that:
[It seems clear that petitioner was responsible for
a large part of the 10-month delay which occurred
and that petitioner neither showed nor claimed that
the preparation of his defense was prejudiced by
reason of the delay. 93 S. Ct. at 2262.
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Double Jeopardy:
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973)
In Illinois v. Somerville' the United States Su-
preme Court further explained the permissible cir-
cumstances under which a trial judge may declare
a mistrial after impaneling a jury, without barring
the retrial of the defendant on grounds of double
jeopardy. The defendant was brought to trial un-
der an indictment charging him with theft. After
the jury was impaneled, but before any evidence
was presented, the prosecutor advised the court
that the indictment was fatally deficient because
it failed to allege that the defendant intended to
deprive the owner of his property as required by
Illinois law.2 Since the defect could not be cured by
amendment and could be asserted on appeal to
overturn a final judgment of conviction, the trial
judge declared a mistrial over the defendant's
objection.' After the grand jury returned a second
indictment alleging the requisite intent, the de-
fendant was retried and convicted, and his convic-
tion was upheld in the Illinois court of appeals.4
The defendant then sought federal writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that his second trial violated the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 5 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of habeas corpus,' but the
United States Supreme Court remanded the case
for further consideration in light of two of its recent
decisions interpreting the double jeopardy clauseY
1410 U.S. 458 (1973).
2ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1(d) (1) (1971).
3 See IL. CoNsT. art. II, § 8 (1870), which is now art.
1, § 7. ILL. CoNsT. art. I, § 7 (1970). This section pro-
vides in part that no person shall be held to answer for
a criminal offense unless indicted by a grand jury, ex-
cept in cases in which the punishment is by fine or im-
prisonment other than in the penitentiary. The Illinois
statutes further provide that only formal defects in
indictments may be cured by amendment. See ILL. R v.
STAT. ch. 38, § 111-5 (1971). Since the defect here af-
fected a substantive part of the charge against the
defendant, the only way to cure it was to have the
grand jury reindict the defendant.
4 People v. Somerville, 88 Ill. App. 2d 212,232 N.E.2d
115 (1967).
IU.S. CoNsT. amend. V, which provides in part:
"... nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb .... " The Supreme Court made the fifth
amendment applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969). Most states have similar clauses within
their constitutions. See SIGLER, DoUBLE JEoPAdny
33-34 (1969). The origin of the constitutional protec-
tion against double jeopardy is found in the common
law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. See
Comment, Double Jeopardy and the Necessity Rule, 14
U. PIr. L. REv. 583 (1953).
6 429 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1970).
See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1970);
On remand, the Seventh Circuit decided that
habeas corpus should have been granted on the
grounds that the trial judge had improperly termi-
nated the first trial8 In a five-to-four decision, the
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, and
held that under the circumstances of this case the
state could retry the defendant without violating
the prohibition against double jeopardy.9
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Rehnquist
argued that the trial judge had not abused his dis-
cretion in terminating the first trial. He concluded
that the judge had properly applied the test of
"manifest necessity," 10 which the Court had previ-
ously established as the standard for determining
the circumstances under which a trial judge can
declare a mistrial once jeopardy has attached,"
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). Both
Downum and Jorn upheld a claim of double jeopardy
after the state attempted to retry the defendant fol-
lowing the declaration of a mistrial. See notes 16-17
infra.
8 447 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1971).
9 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973).
10 That test was first enunciated by Justice Story in
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580(1824), in which the Supreme Court held that the
failure of the jury to agree on a verdict of either ac-
quittal or conviction did not bar the retrial of the de-
fendant:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law
has invested Courts of justice with the authority to
discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever
in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the
act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion
on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the
circumstances which would render it proper to in-
terfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with
the greatest caution under urgent circumstances,
and for very plain and obvious cases; and, in capital
cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful
how they interfere with any of the chances of life in
favor of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the
right to order discharge; and the security which the
public have for the faithful, sound and con-
scientious exercise of this discretion rests in this
case as in other cases, upon the responsibility of
the Judges, under their oaths of office.
Id. at 580.
1 The Supreme Court has held that for the purposes
of the double jeopardy clause, jeopardy attaches when
a criminal trial commences before a judge or jury.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957);
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1949). The Court
has subsequently assumed that this takes place when
the jury has been selected and sworn. See Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
The Illinois courts argued that jeopardy had not at-
tached in this case because the defendant was brought
to trial under an invalid indictment. People v. Somer-
ville, 88 I1. App. 2d 212, 216-17, 232 N.E.2d 115, 117
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without barring the retrial of the defendant on
grounds of double jeopardy.2 According to Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, under the "manifest necessity"
test, the trial judge must balance the interests of
the state in seeking public justice against the policy
considerations underlying the double jeopardy
clause in determining whether it is permissible to
declare a mistrial:"3
The determination by the trial court to abort a
criminal proceeding where jeopardy has attached is
not one to be lightly undertaken, since the inter-
est of the defendant in having his fate determined
by the jury first impanelled is itself a weighty one
... Nor will the lack of demonstrable additional
prejudice preclude the defendant's invocation of
(1967). This argument was rejected by the Seventh
Circuit which held that the time when jeopardy at-
taches must be determined by the federal standard.
Somerville v. Illinois, 447 F.2d 733, 735 (7th Cir. 1971).
See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969);
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
1" Since Perez v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
529 (1824), the Supreme Court has applied the "mani-
fest necessity" test in a number of situations to uphold
the propriety of the declaration of a mistrial. See, e.g.,
Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961) (jury dis-
charged because of potentially prejudicial testimony
about defendant's previous criminal record); Wade v.
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (military court-martial
discharged due to tactical necessity in the field); Lovato
v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916) (jury discharged
because of possible irregularities in pleadings); Keerl
v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909) (jury discharged after
three days of deliberation for failure to reach a verdict);
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902) (jury discharged
after one day deliberations for failure to reach a verdict);
Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (jury
discharged because one juror had served on grand jury
indicting defendant); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S.
263 (1892) (jury discharged after forty hours for failure
to reach a verdict); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S.
148 (1891) (jury discharged because letter published in
newspaper made jurors' impartiality doubtful).
In Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961),
the Court intimated that in situations where the mis-
trial is declared for the benefit of the defendant, the
state can retry the defendant under the "manifest
necessity" test. This rule was specifically rejected in
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 483 (1971).
"1 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957), where the Court explained the policy considera-
tions underlying this provision:
[T~he State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to con-
vict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compeWng him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty.
See generally SIGLER, Dou-BrE JEoPARDY 155-69 (1969);
Comment, Double Jeopardy: Its History, Rationale and
Future, 70 DicK. L. REv. 377 (1966); Note, Double
Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HAav. L. Rv.
1272, 1274 (1964).
the double jeopardy bar in the absence of some
important countervailing interest of proper judi-
cial administration'... But where the declaration
of a mistrial implements a reasonable state policy
and aborts a proceeding that would have produced
a verdict that could have been upset at will by one
of the parties, the defendant's interest in pro-
ceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing
and equally legitimate demand for public justice.1'
Mr. Justice Rehnquist concluded by stating that
a declaration of a mistrial under the circumstances
of this case would be improper only when the
prosecutor had used the state procedure to harass
the defendant. 5
In arguing that the double jeopardy clause pre-
cluded his second trial, the defendant relied heavily
on Downurn v. United States16 and United States v.
Jorn, 7 which were cited by the Seventh Circuit as
requiring the reversal of his conviction. 8 In
Downum, after the defendant's case was called to
trial and a jury was impaneled, the prosecutor ad-
vised the court that two of his key witnesses were
unavailable. 19 The trial judge then dismissed the
first jury to allow the prosecutor time to secure the
presence of his witnesses. At the second tril, the
defendant was convicted over his claim of former
jeopardy. The Supreme Court reversed his convic-
tion, and held that the trial judge had abused his
discretion in terminating the first trial.20
In Jorn the trial judge declared a mistrialafter
he determined that the government's witnesses
were not properly advised of their privilege against
self-incrimination before testifying. 2 The case was
4 410 U.S. at 471.
15 Id. at 469.
16 372 U.S. 734 (1963). For discussions of this case,
see Note, 28 ALBANY L. REV. 162 (1964); Note, 16
ALA. L. REv. 133 (1963).
'7400 U.S. 470 (1971). For discussions of this case,
see Note, 26 RuTGERS L. REv. 682 (1973); Note, 32
LA. L. REv. 145 (1971).
18 See Somerville v. Illinois, 447 F.2d 733, 734-35
(7th Cir. 1971).
19 Subpoenas for all of the prosecutor's witnesses had
been delivered to the United States marshall, but he
waited until the day before trial to discover that the
subpoenas had not been served. The prosecutor allowed
the jury to be selected and sworn even though he knew
his witnesses had not been found. Downum v. United
States, 372 U.S. 734, 735 (1963).
20 Id. at 736-37.
21 In Jorn the defendant was charged with violations
of the Internal Revenue Code. Five of the government's
witnesses were taxpayers whom the defendant had
aided in the preparation of their income tax returns.
After the first of these witnesses was called to testify,
defense counsel suggested that they be warned of their
constitutional rights. After further inquiry, the trial
judge decided that all of the witnesses should be given a
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set for retrial before another jury, but on the de-
fendant's pretrial motion, the judge dismissed the
case on the grounds of former jeopardy. In a plural-
ity opinion, the Supreme Court agreed with the
trial judge and held that the grounds for declaring
a mistrial were insufficient to override the de-
fendant's interests under the double jeopardy
clause.22
In response to the defendant's claim that these
cases were controlling, Mr. justice Rehnquist dis-
tinguished Jorn by describing the actions of the
trial judge there as erratic and, under the circum-
stances of that case, wholly unnecessary.23 In
Somerville, on the other hand, the mistrial served a
legitimate state interest and was the only effective
way to cure the defect in the indictment. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist also felt that Somerville was dis-
tinguishable from Downum since the mistrial in
Downum was declared to allow the prosecutor time
to strengthen his case and might result in great
delay to the defendant.24 Here the delay was mini-
mal and did not give the prosecutor an unfair ad-
vantage.
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and
Douglas, dissented on the grounds that Downum
and Jorn were controlling, and that, in any case,
the prosecutor's failure to inspect the indictment
before trial should not serve to deprive the de-
fendant of his rights under the prohibition against
double jeopardy. 25 Mr. justice Marshall also filed
chance to consult with an attorney. He then declared
the mistrial. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 472-
73 (1971).
2 2 Justice Harlan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Douglas and Marshall, upheld the trial judge's
ruling on the grounds that the double jeopardy clause
had been violated. Justices Black and Brennan agreed
that the trial judge's decision should not be reversed
but felt that the Court had no jurisdiction. Justices
Stewart, White and Blackmun dissented on thegrounds
that the retrial of the defendant would not have
violated the double jeopardy clause.23410 U.S. at 469.
24 Id.
25 According to Mr. Justice White:
Apparently the majority finds "manifest necessity"
for a mistrial and the retrial of the defendant in
the 'state's policy of preserving the right of each
defendant to insist that a criminal prosecution
against him be commenced by the action of a grandjury' and the implementation of that policy in the
absence from Illinois procedural rules of any pro-
cedure for the amendment of indictments. Con-
ceding the reasonableness of such a policy, it must
be remembered that the inability to amend the
indictment does not come into play, and a mistrial
is not necessitated, unless aw error on the part of
the State in the framing of the indictment is com-
mitted. Only when the indictment is defective-
only when the State has failed to properly execute
a dissenting opinion in which he concluded that the
majority opinion had abandoned the tradition of
previous cases by adopting a new balancing test,
whose elements are stated on such a high level of
abstraction as to give judges virtually no guidance
in deciding subsequent cases.26
While the Court's application of the "manifest
necessity" test under the circumstances of this case
has some support in previous cases,'2 its decision
does lend considerable uncertainty as to the con-
tinued application of certain principles enunciated
in Downum v. United States5' and United Staes v.
Jorn.2' First, in both cases the Court stressed the
paramount importance of protecting the de-
fendant's interest in settling his case because of his
exposure to the embarrassment, anxiety and ex-
pense of trial.30 In Dowmum, for example, the ab-
sence of the prosecutor's key witnesses would have
resulted in the acquittal of the defendant on cer-
tain counts in the indictment, but the Supreme
Court felt that this was insufficient justification for
declaring the mistrial without barring the retrial
of the defendant on grounds of double jeopardy."
The Somerville Court, on the other hand, enun-
ciates a balancing test in which it places the in-
terests of the state in securing an error-free con-
viction above the interests of the defendant in
its responsibilities to frame a proper indictment-
does the State's procedural framework necessitate
the mistrial.
Id. at 475.
26 410 U.S. at 483.
21 See Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916),
where the jury was discharged after the prosecutor
realized that the defendant had not pleaded to the
indictment. See also Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684
(1949), in which the absence of witnesses due to com-
bat conditions was held sufficient to justify the declara-
tion of a mistrial without barring the retrial of the
defendant.
It has been suggested that there are two rules dis-
cernible from the cases. See Note, 26 RuxGEaRs L. REv.
682, 685, n.34 (1973). The first is that absent a showing
of abuse of discretion, there is an assumption that a
mistrial does not bar retrial. See Gori v. United States,
367 U.S. 364 (1961); Brock v. North Carolina, 344
U.S. 424 (1953); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135(1909). The second rule is that absent a showing of
substantial justifying circumstances, a mistrial pre-
cludes retrial. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470(1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963);
Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891); Cor-
nero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931). The
decision in Somerville can be interpreted as following
the first line of cases.
"372 U.S. 734 (1963).
"400 U.S. 470 (1971).
0 See note 13 supra.
1 See note 19 supra.
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having his fate determined by the first jury. It also
indicates its willingness to allow various state pro-
cedural rules to override the constitutional protec-
tion against double jeopardy:
Since this Court's decision in Benton v. Maryland
... federal courts i1l be confronted with such
claims that arise in large measure from the often
diverse procedural rules existing in the 50 states.
Federal courts should not be quick to conclude that
simply because a state procedure does not conform
to the corresponding federal statute or rule, it does
not serve a legitimate state policy."
Secondly, while the cases applying the "mani-
fest necessity" test have not established rigid rules
for trial judges to follow,n both Downum and Jorn
indicated that trial judges should exercise their
discretion in declaring mistrials only in the most
extraordinary and striking circumstances.4 While
the Somerville Court does emphasize that trial
judges must weigh the interests of the competing
parties, 5 the majority, as Mr. Justice Marshall
points out, elevates the "manifest necessity" test
to a new level of abstraction.36 While this approach
may give trial judges more flexibility in administer-
ing criminal trials, it provides virtually no guidance
for the protection of the defendant's rights under
the double jeopardy clause."'
Finally, in both Dovnum and Jon the Supreme
Court expressed its dissatisfaction with the trial
judge's determination that prosecutorial error
could justify the declaration of a mistrial under the
circumstances of those cases. In Jorn, for example,
the plurality opinion stated:
Unquestionably an important factor to be con-
sidered is the need to hold litigants on both sides
to standards of professional conduct in the clash of
an adversary criminal process... The trial judge
must recognize the lack of preparedness by the
2410 U.S. at 468. See also Duncan v. United States,
405 U.S. 127 (1972), in which the Court dismissed a
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in a case
involving the dismissal of an indictment under the
rules of criminal pleading peculiar to a particular state
followed by a retrial under a proper indictment.
3See notes 10, 12 supra.
11 In Downum the Court stated:
The discretion to discharge the jury before it has
reached a verdict is to be exercised 'only in very
extraordinary and striking circumstances'.
372 U.S. at 736. See also United States v. Watson, 28
Fed. Cas. 499, 500-01 (1856); United States v. Shoe-
maker, 27 Fed. Cas. 1067 (1840).
'
5 410 U.S. at 471.
-6 Id. at 483.
17 See note 27 supra.
government... directly implicates policies under-
pinning both the double jeopardy provision and
the speedy trial guarantee."
The Somerville Court, though not clearly coun-
tenancing prosecutorial negligence, indicates that
only prosecutorial manipulation can justify the
application of the double jeopardy clause when a
procedural error would provide the defendant with
grounds for reversal on appeal. 9 Even limited to
those situations where reversal would be certain,
the decision still overrides a policy often stated in
the cases that the prosecutor must come prepared
for trial and take his chances once the jury is im-
paneled. 40 To the extent that Somerville can be
used to justify the retrial of a defendant in situa-
tions where the prosecutor has made an error in
judgment at some point before verdict, which may
not automatically result in reversal on appeal, the
decision clearly reverses a policy enunciated in
prior cases. 4'
In conclusion, the decision in Somerville is ob-
jectionable because it prescribes a vague balancing
test and accepts prosecutorial oversight. While the
decision has potentially far-reaching implications
for the judicial administration of criminal trials, it
lends considerable uncertainty as to the vitality of
both Downum and Jorn, and may further serve to
dilute the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy.
I410 U.S. at 475.
"1 See note 15 supra.40See, e.g., United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662
(1896), where the Court stated:
This case, in short, presents the novel and un-
heard of spectacle, of a public officer, whose busi-
ness it was to frame a correct bill, openly alleging
his own inaccuracy or neglect, as a reason for a
second trial, when it is not pretended that the
merits were not fairly put in issue on the first...
If this be tolerated, when are trials of the ac-
cused to end?
Id. at 667-68. See also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 485 (1971); Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d
69, 71 (9th Cir. 1931).
a In Jorn the plurality opinion stated:
The determination to allow reprosecution in
these circumstances reflects the judgment that the
defendant's double jeopardy interests, however de-
fined, do not go so far as compel society to so
mobilize its decisionmaking resources that it will
be prepared to assure the defendant a single pro-
ceeding free from harmful governmental or judicial
error. But it is also clear that recognition that the
defendant can be reprosecuted for the same offense
after successful appeal does not compel the con-
clusion that double jeopardy policies are confined
to prevention of prosecutorial or judicial over-
reaching.
400 U.S. at 484.
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Voir Dire Examination:
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973)
In Ham v. South Carolina,1 the United States
Supreme Court faced an issue involving the scope
of the vair dire examination. 2 The Court unani-
mously held that a defendant must be permitted
to quiz the veniremen as to possible racial preju-
dice. The majority also held, with Justices Douglas
and Marshall dissenting, that a refusal to inquire
about specific bias against beards, subsequent to
the trial judge's general inquiry as to any forms
of impartiality, did not constitute a violation of a
constitutional right.
The petitioner in Ham was convicted of posses-
sion of marijuana and sentenced to 18 months im-
prisonment. Petitioner, a young bearded Negro,
who had no previous criminal record, contended
during trial that he was framed on the drug charge
because of his well publicized civil rights activities.
On voir dire petitioner's counsel requested the
court to ask the veniremen four questions relating
to possible prejudice against the defendant. The
first two dealt with potential racial prejudice; the
third probed for a bias against beards; and the
fourth aimed at possible pre-trial publicity. The
trial judge refused to ask any of the proposed ques-
tions, but instead submitted three general ques-
tions required by state law.3 They inquired about
the existence of prejudice of any sort against the
defendant or the existence of preconceived notions
of guilt or innocence. On appeal to the South Caro-
lina supreme court the resulting conviction was
upheld.4 In discussing the issue of the scope of the
voir dire examination the majority of the court
concluded that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion. The majority reasoned that the pre-
1 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
2 The voir dire examination in this case was con-
ducted by the trial judge as authorized by statute.
However, the statute also provided that the court may
submit additional questions proposed by a defendant
or a prosecutor at its discretion. S. C. CODE § 38-202
(1962).
This procedure is suggested also by the ABA PRoj-
ECT ON MINUIUM STANDARDS FOR CRInUNAL JUsTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING To TaAL By JURY, § 2, 4, at
66-67 (Approved Draft 1968). In federal courts, Rule
24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides that the trial judge may conduct the voir dire or
permit counsel to quiz the prospective jurors directly,
although the former has been preferred. However, the
rule is silent as to the scope of the voir dire examina-
tion. FED. R. Cnmt. P. 24(a).
3 S. C. CODE § 38-202 (1962).
'256 S.C. 1, 180 S.E.2d 628 (1972).
scribed questions had sufficiently covered the re-
quested area. The dissent, however, argued that
Aldridge v. United States5 was controlling and re-
quired that petitioner's question be submitted to
the panel of prospective jurors.' That case involved
a Negro defendant who was denied on voir dire the
opportunity to question the prospective jurors for
racial prejudice. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for
the Court, said that the "essential demands of
fairness," as expressed by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, required that such
an examination be permitted The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the issue of whether the trial
judge's refusal to ask the suggested questions vio-
lated petitioner's constitutional rights.8
In reversing petitioner's conviction Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion relied heavily on Aldridge
and the constitutional prohibitions against racial
discrimination. He pointed out that the purpose
behind the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
was to insure that the states treat all of their resi-
dents equally, irrespective of their race or color.9
The "constitutional stature" 10 of racial prejudice
required, in the majority's view, that questions
probing for bias of this nature must be allowed.
On the other hand, the question aimed at de-
tecting a prejudice against beards was found by
Justice Rehnquist not to be entitled to a similar
treatment. Although he acknowledged the possi-
bility of such a bias, it was "constitutionally [im-
possible to) distinguish possible prejudice against
beards from a host of other similar prejudices." 11
Implicit in this candid admission was an apprehen-
5 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
6 It is interesting to note that the dissenting justices
did not distinguish between questions relating to
racial prejudice and questions relating to a bias against
beards. In their view Aldridge required both.
7 283 U.S. at 310.
8 The Court was unanimous in agreeing that the
record before it did not substantiate charges of pre-
trial publicity. Therefore the Court did not discuss the
merits of the issue whether the last question posed by
the defendant should have been included on the voir
dire examination. 409 U.S. at 528 (majority opinion);
Id. at 531 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Id. at 529-530
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (sub silentio).
9 He cited the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873), where it was argued unsuccessfully
that the fourteenth amendment is not limited to
problems of ex-slaves and racial discrimination.




sion that by giving the posed question a constitu-
tional imprimatur, a legal precedent would be set
requiring that all questions submitted by de-
fendants be asked, irrespective of their relevancy
and significance. It would be extremely difficult, in
Justice Rehnquist's judgment, for a trial judge or
the appellate courts to justify on some rational
basis the distinction between questions relating
to a possible prejudice against beards and questions
probing for biases against other physical traits.
Nevertheless, he qualified his disallowance:
The trial judge's refusal to inquire as to a particular
bias against beards, after his inquiries as to bias in
general, does not reach the level of constitutional
violation."
Moreover, the narrow reading of Aldridge, re-
stricting the required questions to racial prejudice
only, served to establish a dual-level classification
of prejudices. Although Aldridge raised the issue of
possible racial prejudice, the holding was not ex-
plicitly limited to its factual circumstances and it
has not been interpreted so by other courts."
Where the credibility of a defendant or some other
witnesses was at stake, various questioning has
been allowed. Thus, in United States v. Napoleone,'14
the defendant was entitled to question the venire-
men whether their objectivity in rendering the ver-
dict would be affected by their ethical and moral
views toward lying or liars. The court cited Aldridge
for the proposition that the essential demands of
fairness control the trial judge's discretion as to the
scope of the voir dire examination. The concept of
fairness, as propounded in Aldridge, was not, in the
12 Id. (emphasis added).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Gassaway, 456 F.2d 624(5th Cir. 1972), involving a failure to ask whether any
of the jurors were inclined to give more weight to
testimony of a police officer, because of his position
than to any other witness in the case was not an error;
United States v. Poole, 450 F.2d 1082 (3d Cir. 1965),
where the trial judge refused to allow a question per-
taining to a juror's prior experience as a victim of
crime was error; Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d
543 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Burger, J.), where the failure
to ask whether any of the jurors were inclined to give
more weight to testimony of a police officer than to any
other witness in the case was reversible error; Gorin v.
United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir. 1963), involving
a failure to ask the same question as in Brown was not
necessarily an error; Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d
475 (D.C. Cir. 1959), where failure to ask the same
question was an error; Phenious v. State, 11 Md. App.
385, 274 A.2d 658 (1971). But see United States v.
Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Gore, 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth
v. Foster, 293 A.2d 94 (Pa. Super. 1972).
14 349 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1965).
court's view, restricted to elimination of jurors
harboring racial prejudice only.
The Ham holding is inconsistent with the other
decisions of the Court. Since Irwin v. Dowd"5 held
that an impartial jury was constitutionally man-
dated in state courts, a defendant's request to
examine for possible bias must clearly be without
merit in order for the trial judge to refuse inquiry
of veniremen. Petitioner here was charged with
possession of marijuana, a crime associated cus-
tomarily with young and non-conforming elements
of society. In light of his defense at the trial, bias
against beards becomes a factor of greater signifi-
cance for the jury in arriving at their verdict.
There was a great likelihood that petitioner's testi-
mony was given less credibility because of his non-
conventional appearance and the possible assump-
tion of guilt arising from the association of drug
use with non-conformity.
Furthermore, the dual level approach of the
majority is subject to logical infirmities. If the
concern and the goal is to secure an impartial jury,
then, in reality, the differences in the source and
the nature of the prejudices are irrelevant. By
being denied an opportunity to have his questions
submitted to the prospective jurors, a defendant
is in either case deprived of his constitutional privi-
lege to be judged by an unbiased jury. 6 The issue
at stake is his ability to secure a fair trial, not the
nature of the prejudice against him, constitutional
or otherwise. The faulty reasoning is evident fur-
ther in the majority's distinction between general
and specific examinations. If the general inquiry
was deemed to he sufficient to elicit all types of
biases, including one against beards, then no spe-
cific inquiry for racial prejudice should be required
since such a prejudice is only one of many forms
of partiality. By allowing one type of questioning
and denying the other, the Court implicitly recog-
"5366 U.S. 717 (1961). In Irwin a state conviction
was set aside because newspaper publicity prevented a
fair trial. Although each juror expressed his belief that
he could remain fair and impartial, the Court thought
that the likelihood of the verdict being affected by the
prejudice was substantial enough to require a reversal.
16 It has been argued that a true neutrality is not a
realistic goal since every individual has some views
which do affect his thinking. The purpose of the voir
dire examination, then, becomes to insure a certain
degree of impartiality, not absolute impartiality. Thejurors who hold a specific and identifiable bias, which
may prevent them from being objective, are to be
eliminated from the panel. Yet, it is quite likely that
some of the unconscious personal beliefs, capable of
prejudicing one's thinking will not be discovered. See
Levit, et al., Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical
Study, 44 S. CAL. L. Rav. 916, 925 (1971).
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nized that general inquiry fails to elicit impar-
tiality'
7
Moreover, the Court has frequently intervened
to insure the impartiality of the jury, not limiting
its action, however, only to racial prejudice. Where
the jury selection process resulted in a jury inclined
to impose capital punishment more readily, the
Court reversed the conviction. In Groppi v. Wis-
consln,'9 state law imposing restriction on change
of venue, thought necessary by the defendant, a
white civil rights activist, to avoid jury prejudice
was invalidated. Similarly, in Morford v. United
States," defendant's alleged ties with the Communist
Party were held to be a proper subject of inquiry
during the voir dire examination.
The Ham holding represents a departure from
the Court's previous willingness to safeguard the
right to an impartial jury. That stance in situations
of alleged jury misbehavior 2' has been replaced by
17 The proponents of an extensive voir dire examina-
tion contend that only specific questions posed by the
accused's counsel, who customarily is most aware of
the issues and the evidence to be presented to the
jury, are capable of bringing out hidden prejudices
since they are aimed at a specific end. Moreover, it is
said that the examination by the Court is mechanical
and formal, failing to elicit any truthful responses from
the prospective jurors. The veniremen, when ques-
tioned by the court, may feel capable of disregarding
their biases and will keep silent when requested to
divulge them. This is especially true where the preju-
dices are held almost on an unconscious level. Since it
is impossible to reenact the atmosphere of the trial and
the impact of the questioning upon the jurors cannot
be truthfully assessed, the appellate courts are not
capable of fully protecting the right of the accused.
Therefore, the argument concludes, counsel with
personal knowledge and interest must be permitted to
question the jurors if the voir dire examination is to be
effective in securing an impartial jury. See Comment,
Voir Dire In Southern California: Where Is It Going?
Where Should It Go?, 10 SAN Di mo L. Rzv. 395, 401-
403, 406 (1973).18 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
29400 U.S. 505 (1971). In Groppi, Justice Stewyart
said for the Court:
There we are concerned with the methods available
to assure an impartial jury in a situation where
because of prejudicial publicity or for some other
reason the community from which the jury is to
be drawn may be already permeated with the
hostility toward the defendant.
Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
The Court's concern is also evident later in the opinion:
Another way is to provide a method of jury quali-
fication that will promote through the exercise of
challenges to the venire-peremptory and for cause
-the exclusion of prospective jurors infected with
prejudices fronf which they come.
Id. at 509-10.
20 339 U.S. 259 (1950).
It See e.g., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (where the
decision provided protection from inflammatory press
the attitude of "presumptive reasonableness" of
juries. In adopting this new posture the. Court
shows more concern with needs of expediency than
with the rights of an accused.23
The opinion of Justice Douglas, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, agreed with the ma-
jority about the need to question for racial preju-
dice24 but departed from the interpretation given to
Aldridge and the import of bias against beards.
First, Justice Douglas pointed out that Aldridge
was not restricted only to inquiry as to racial
prejudice but included all prejudices of. a "seri-
ous" 
25 
character. He argued that in light of the
current importance attached to the length.of one's
hair,26 a possible bias against beards was sufficiently
"serious" to be added to the special category
created by the majority. Where defendant's ap-
pearance is especially reflective upon his credibility
and presumption of innocence the danger ef a
biased jury is too great to preclude a defendant
from his inquiry.
Justice Marshall adopted a more flexible ap-
proach. While challenging the dubious distinction
created by -the majority of the Court, he pointed
out that the right to an impartial juiry was never
restricted to one group in the population. He noted:
coverage and disruptive influences in the courtroom);
Irwin v. Dowd, 336 U.S. 717 (1960).
1 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 398 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting). In Johnson, Justice Stewart
criticized the majority's premise that "each juror will
faithfully perform his assigned duty." Id. at 379. The
majority insisted that the jurors will disregard their
biases and prejudices in rendering their verdict, Justice
Stewart challenged this presumption of regularity by
pointing to a number of cases where the Court held a
different attitude.
2 3Chief Justice Burger commented on this critical
problem at the National Conference on the'Judiciary
at Williamsburg, Virginia, on March 12, 1971, stating
that selection of a jury has "become in itself a major
piece of litigation consuming days or weeks." L.A.
Times, March 13, 1971, § 7, at 17, col. 1. It is not the
purpose of this note to deal in depth with the abuses of
the voir dire examination. See generally Levit, et at.,
supra note 16; Comment, supra note 17. See also State
v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 255 A.2d 193 (1969), dicussing
the failure of trial judges to exercise proper contiol over
voir dire.
24 409 U.S. at 529 (separate opinion of Douglas, T.2rThe right to examine jurors on voir dire .as to
the existence of a disqualifying state of mind has
been upheld with respect to other races than the
black race and in relation to religious and other
prejudices of a serious character.
283 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).-
2 He cited cases where the controversy between the
litigants stemmed from the disagreement as ta proper
and socially accepted appearance. See, e.g., Olff v.




"It makes little difference to a criminal defendant
whether the jury has prejudged him because of the
color of his skin or because of the length of his
hair." 2 In elaborating upon the various techniques
of securing an impartial jury that the Court has
allowed for, he stressed the importance of the voir
dire examinations in achieving this goal.2 To him,
the right to challenge, which a defendant is ad-
mitted to have,29 is meaningless unless a relevant
inquiry as to possible prejudices of the veniremen
is permitted. 0 Yet he would not allow all questions,
irrespective of their significance and relevancy.
Unlike the majority of the court, he would require
a defendant to make a preliminary showing of the
significance and pertinence of his proposed ques-
tions, "where the claimed prejudice is of a novel
character," " before propounding them to the
prospective jurors.3
However, he emphasized throughout the opinion
that at minimum an opportunity to show actual
bias must be preserved.n3 The apparent absolute
ban, reached by the majority, upon questions
deemed to be non-serious, represented, in his view,
an improper "balance between competing demands
of fairness and expedition." 3'
Although justices Douglas and Marshall diff-
ered as to the proper approach to be taken, they
agreed on two points. First, both interpreted Al-
dridge as not being restricted to questions relating
to racial prejudice. Second, they reached the same
conclusion that in the factual circumstances of
Ham the inquiry as to bias against beards had a
substantial bearing upon the jury's verdict and
should have been allowed.
The result in Ham represents a further erosion
of the right to a jury trial.35 By developing a bi-
' 409 U.S. at 531-32 (separate opinion of Marshall,J.).
21 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), where
it was acknowledged that extensive and probing voir
dire has been accepted in American trials as a matter
of practice, and that it is a proper tool, almost a neces-
sary pre-requisite, for the intelligent exercise of the
peremptory charges.
29 See, e.g., Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396,
408, 412 (1894); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370
(1892).
30 409 U.S. at 532 (separate opinion of Marshall, J.).
11 Id. at 533. Justice Marshall thus replied to Justice
Rehnquist's fear that irrelevant questions would have
to be tolerated.
32 Id.
1 Id. at 534.
34 Id.
"The Ham ruling is compounded by the recent
decisions of the Court in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970), sustaining juries with fewer than twelve
members and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
level categorization of prejudices the Court is
diluting the constitutional requirement of an im-
partial jury. The position taken by the majority
emphasizes the nature of the prejudice rather than
its functional effect upon the jury's verdict. The
issue, according to them, is whether the partiality
is of a "constitutional stature" 36 and, therefore, of
a serious character-not whether there is a greater
likelihood of convicting an innocent person. Al-
though the Court addressed itself in Ham only to
racial prejudice, the dual standard established
there will undoubtedly be put to use to classify
other types of partialities. The categorization
"serious" and "non-serious" will most likely be
aligned with protections traditionally afforded by
the fourteenth amendment. This formalistic ap-
proach will prevail even though in Ham the major-
ity's opinion was careful to recite the historical
standing of racial prejudice as a motivatink force
behind the fourteenth amendment, since the Court
has not, at least until now, limited the protection
of this amendment to racial groups.Y
Thus where the possible prejudice might be
based on national origin, sex, religion or other
classification found previously to be inherently
"suspect," 1 the Court will most likely intervene to
(1972), and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972),
sustaining the constitutionality of nonunamious jury
verdicts in state criminal trials. In light of Ham's limi-
tation of the scope of the voir dire examination, the
reduction of number of jurors per case becomes very
significant. With the introduction of smaller juries, the
likelihood of a biased jury is very real. This critical
problem is even further aggravated by the dilution of
the requirement that guilt be determined beyond
reasonable doubt. Undoubtedly, these factors will
enter a defendant's mind when demanding a jury trial
and may cause him to waive a jury trial altogether.
36 409 U.S. at 528.
3 The fourteenth amendment has been used to in-
validate many state laws, not only discriminating
against the Negro populace but encompassing every
aspect of our society. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 409 U.S.
81 (1973), where the Court held that a state abortion
law violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972),
where a state replevin statute was found to be in con-
flict with due process clause; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972), where procedural safeguards were
required by the fourteenth amendment when a state
seeks to revoke parole.
The term inherently "suspect" classification which
apparently bad its genesis in cases involving racial
discrimination symbolizes a classification which is
based on a forbidden criteria and, therefore, demanding
a compelling state interest to be upheld. Wealth, race,
creed or color were held to be included in the above
category. See generally Harer v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Also in Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the unanimous Court in-
validated an Idaho probate provision giving men
mandatory preference over women when persons of the
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allow such a voir dire examination. Such prejudices
are of a "serious" character 9
However, the suggested distinctions will be per-
missible only if a general inquiry, similar to the
one in Ham, is allowed. Where such an inquiry is
denied, the Court would require that a certain
same priority class applied for appointment to ad-
minister deceased's estate although the sex-as-a-suspect
classification issue was not expressly reached. However,
that classification may become prohibited by an ex-
plicit constitutional requirement if the pending equal
rights amendment is adopted.39 They are serious enough to be given constitutional
,dimensions. See note 38 supra.
Rules of Evidence:
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)
In Chlambers v. Mississippi,' the Supreme Court
examined two Mississippi common law rules of
evidence to determine whether their joint applica-
tion denied the accused a trial in accord with due
process. The two rules in question were Mississippi's
voucher rule which states that one may not im-
peach his own witness and the hearsay rule exclud-
ing declarations against penal interest. The Court
held that under the facts of this case, the joint
-application of these evidentiary rules deprived
Chambers of a fair trial.2 The Court thus cast a
shadow over the continued vitality of these evi-
dentiary rules, taken individually and in circum-
stances other than those facing Chambers.
Leon Chambers was convicted of murdering a
policeman. At his trial, Chambers advanced two
defenses. He first claimed that he never shot the
policeman. His other defense was that Gable
McDonald shot the officer. Before Chambers' trial,
McDonald had confessed to the murder, but later
repudiated that confession. 3 Chambers' claim that
McDonald did the killing was supported at trial by
two witnesses: one, a man who saw McDonald
shoot the officer, the other, a man who saw Mc-
Donald, gun in hand, just after the shooting.
1410 U.S. 284 (1973).
2 Id. at 302. The Court took care to point out that
its holding established no new principles of constitu-
tional law or implied any incursion by the Court into
state control over state trial rules and procedure.
3 Id. at 288. McDonald's reason for repudiation lay
in his claimed disillusionment with a Reverend Stokes
who had convinced the impressionable McDonald that
he would share in a large tort recovery from the city
and not go to jail if he confessed.
minimum opportunity be provided to secure a fair
trial. This result can be anticipated from justice
Rehnquist's qualifying remark when he said that
the refusal to permit questioning relating to preju-
dice against beards was not a constitutional viola-
tion.40 The breakdown of the voir dire examination
into general and specific questioning and the rea-
soning that the former may elicit some types of
prejudice but not all, is illustrative of the logical
default propounded by the Court in Ham.
40 In order to deny even the most general inquiry,
the Court would have to overrule rwin which made
an impartial jury a constitutional requirement.
Chambers' defense that McDonald was the
murderer was thwarted by the trial court in two
ways. First, the court denied Chambers' request to
cross-examine McDonald as an adverse witness.4
This denial evoked the voucher rule issue. Second,
the trial court held inadmissible the -testimony of
three friends of McDonald, to whom McDonald
separately admitted the crime.5 This ruling of in-
admissibility of McDonald's friends' testimony
initiated Chambers' attack upon the rule excluding
declarations against penal interest.
Chambers objected to these two rulings immedi-
ately on non-constitutional grounds. In his motion
4 Id. at 291-92. Chambers' pretrial motion requested
the trial court to order McDonald to appear and allow
Chambers to call McDonald as an adverse witness if
the state refused to call McDonald. The trial court
granted the former, but reserved ruling on the latter.
During the trial, the state never called McDonald as
their witness. Chambers was behooved to call Mc-
Donald, whose confession and repudiation of the
murder for which Chambers was on trial was, indeed,
harmful to Chambers. After Chambers introduced
McDonald's confession, the state cross-examined and
McDonald told the reasons for his repudiation. This
testimony was in McDonald's interests and harmful
to Chambers. Chambers then renewed his motion to
examine McDonald as an adverse witness. The trial
court denied, reasoning, "He [McDonald] may be
hostile, but he's not adverse in the sense of the
word .... " This trial court ruling was upheld by the
Mississippi supreme court which felt McDonald's
testimony not adverse to the appellant as "[Nlowhere
did he point the finger at Chambers." 252 So. 2d
217,220 (Miss. 1971). Hence, Chambers was not al-
lowed to impeach his own witness.
6 Mississippi adheres to the common law rule that the
extrajudicial declarations against penal interest are




for a new trial after the guilty verdict was returned
and-in his appeal to the Mississippi supreme court,
Chambers claimed these evidentiary rules rendered
his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him of
due process of law under the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Befote deciding the merits of the case, the
United States Supreme Court had to face a juris-
dictional question. The question lay in two parts.
The first part was steeped in the Mississippi state
prqc.dural requirement of contemporaneous objec-
tion. to the admission of evidence. The Court in
Henry v. Mississippil said that if a state procedural
rule served a valid state interest at trial as decided
by the Supreme Court, a federal question, arising
from the use of this state procedural rule, could not
be reviewed in a federal court This same con-
temporaneous objection rule was indicated to be a
valid state interest by Henrys thus clouding Cham-
bers' constitutional challenge because he waited
until his motion for retrial to make his constitu-
tional challenge to the evidentiary rulings. The
second part of the jurisdictional question arose
from the Mississippi supreme court's silence on the
constitutional questions related to the trial court's
evidentiary rulings. Street v. New York 9 stated that
if the highest state court did not answer a federal
question, it would be assumed that this silence was
due to improper presentation of the issue in the
state courts. 0 This being the case, it would be un-
necessary .for the. Supreme Court to decide the
merits.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, quickly
disposed of the jurisdictional question. Justice
Powell claimed jurisdiction for two reasons. First,
the state never made any challenges before the
Mississippi supreme court that Chambers' consti-
tutional challenges were improperly presented in
the lower state courts. Also, the Mississippi su-
preme court raised no question as to the propriety
of Chambers' constitutional claims. Therefore,
Justice Powell concluded that the issue was prop-
erly before the Mississippi supreme court although
silently rejected by it.
Second, Justice Powell felt that unlike Henry,
this case did not involve the state procedural rule
of contemporaneous objection to evidence. Cham-
bers' constitutional claim, made after the verdict
on a motion for retrial, was not of the same sort as
6379 U.S. 443 (1965).
7 Id. at 447.
'Id. at 449.
'394 U.S. 576 (1969).
,0 Id. at 582.
his non-constitutional objections made to the same
evidentiary rulings at trial. Only at trial did the
contemporaneous objection rule loom significant.
The post-trial constitutional objections related to
the detrimental cumulative effect of the trial court's
rulings upon Chambers' defense. Indeed, it was only
after Chambers' defense that he could sensibly
make constitutional objections caused by the cum-
ulative impact of the trial court's evidentiary rul-
ings." Chambers' situation was distinguishable
from that in Henry as the Henry Court dealt with a
late objection during the trial when the state con-
temporaneous objection rule applied. Since the
state suggested no other procedural ground block-
ing consideration of the merits of Chambers' case,
the Court could consider theses merits unimpeded.
The majority first examined the Mississippi
common law voucher rule which forbade the im-
peachment of one's own witness. The Court held
that the voucher rule, in conjunction with the
inadmissibility of declarations against penal inter-
ests, rendered Chambers' trial unfair. The majority
recognized the right of cross-examination to be im-
plicit in the sixth amendment right of the accused
to confront witnesses against him'2 and a "funda-
mental requirement for the kind of fair trial which
is this country's constitutional goal." 11 Chambers
was not allowed to cross-examine his own witness
McDonald, whose testimony was quite harmful to
him. The Court noted, however, that the right to
confront is not absolute and may be overridden by
competing interests of the criminal law process."
The competing interest here was Mississippi's
voucher rule.
Mississippi's present day voucher rule had its
roots in primitive English trials where people who
appeared on behalf of the parties were not wit-
nesses, but oath-helpers. The function of an oath-
helper was partisan because they were only to sup-
port the cause of those calling them. This differs
from the present day witness' function of neutrally
testifying to questions of both sides to ascertain
facts. The oath-helper's partisanship made it in-
conceivable that one would impeach his own wit-
ness.'- Today, the main argument against the
11410 U.S. at 290 n.3.
'2Id. at 294-95.
13 Id. at 295, citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
405 (1965).
14The right of confrontation was overridden when
trustworthy evidence was given by one outside the
state's jurisdiction. See, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204 (1972).
15 3A J. WioGoRE, EvmmFCNc § 896, at 658-60 (Chad-
bourn ed. 1970).
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voucher rule lies in the rule's archaic foundation
which serves no present purpose. Instead, the
voucher rule may hinder the evidentiary process by
not allowing full examination of witnesses."
The main argument of proponents of the voucher
rule is that a party ought not to have the power to
coerce his own witness 7 The fear is that if it were
possible to impeach one's own disappointing wit-
ness, that witness may be induced, against his be-
lids, to testify favorably for the party calling
him. The major authorities" contend that this fear
is speculative at best because a witness can undergo
the same impeachment from the opponent, equaliz-
ing his fear of not testifying favorably for the party
calling him. More important, to forbid the calling
party this attack leaves him at the mercy of his
witness and opponent. If the truth rests with the
calling party and the witness lies, the adversary
will not attack that witness and the calling party
would be precluded from doing so.i9 The Court
pointed out that under the circumstances, the rule
was doubly harmful to Chambers because he was
precluded from cross-examining McDonald. Also,
Chambers was restricted in the range of his direct
examination due to the voucher rule's corollary
"that the witness is bound by anything he might
say." 2
Mississippi's sole defense of the voucher rule was
that there was no conflict between the rule and
Chambers' rights. This was because the right of
confrontation only existed in relation to those wit-
nesses adverse to the accused. The trial court and
the Mississippi supreme court refused to rule
McDonald an adverse witness in relation to Cham-
bers because McDonald was not openly hostile
toward Chambers.2' McDonald's testimony was,
16The general view by the authorities is summed up
in E. MORGAN, BAsic PRnOnanEs Or EVIDENCE 70-71
(1961):
The fact is that the general prohibition if it ever
had any basis in reason, has no place in any ra-
tional system of investigation in modern society.
And all attempts to modify or qualify it so as to
reach sensible results serve only to demonstrate
its irrationality and to increase the uncertainties
of litigation.
'
73AJ. WiGmoRE, supra note 15, at 663-64. Other
defenses of the voucher rule-that a party is morally
bound by his witnesses and a party guarantees his
witness' credibility-are no longer seriously espoused.11 3A J. WIGUORE, vzupra note 15, at 658-60; C.
McCoQscK, EvIDENcE § 38, at 75-78 (2d ed. 1972);
E. MORGA , BAsic PRO s OF EvmENCE 70-71
(1961).
19 C. McCoRmcK, supra note 18, at 75.
20 410 U.S. at 297.
21 Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d 217, 220 (1971).
This was affirmed by the Mississippi supreme court
however, undoubtedly detrimental to Chambers'
case becauie it contradicted Chambers' defense
that McDonald did the killing.
The Court, discounting technical definitions of
what is adverse in determining if a witness could
be impeached," pointed out the importance of
McDonald to Chambers' case due to the state's
theory that one man committed the murder. Due
to the state's theory, McDonald's repudiation of
his confession had a direct negative effect on Cham-
bers. The Court favored a rejection of the narrow,
unrealistic interpretation of adverse witness given
by the trial court when such an interpretation af-
fected the right of confrontation. In holding that
"the 'voucher' rule, as applied in this case, plainly
interfered with Chambers' right to defend against
the States' charges,"'2 the Court showed its sym-
pathy, as have statutes24 and commentators,' for
the repudiation of such voucher rules.
In the second half of its holding, the Court dealt
with an application of the hearsay rule. The reasons
behind the inadmissibility of hearsay are that these
out of court statements are not made under solemn
oath and the declarant is not available for cross-
examination or observation by the-trier of fact.
Thus, the hearsay rule is premised on the idea that
untrustworthy evidence should not be presented
to the triers of fact.
One exception to the hearsay rule is a declaration
against one's own interests. Admission of those
declarations rests on two grounds. Firsl, the
declaration must have "circumstantial probability
of trustworthiness.' 2 Indeed, one would not
as McDonald "did ... [not] point the finger at Cham-
bers."
22410 U.S. at 297-98. The Court stated that the
right to confront and cross-examine those whose testi-
mony is harmful to the accused has never depended
on whether the witness was initially put on the stand
by the accused or by the state.
2Id. at 298.
24For statutes requiring an adversity ruling in
order to abandon the voucher rule, see F. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.09 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-4 (1953);
VA. CODE § 8-292 (1950); 12 VT. STAT. ANN, § 1642
(1973).
For those holding an adversity ruling unnecessary in
order to abandon the voucher rule, see ALAsKAR. Civ.
P. 43 (g) (11) (a) (1962); AKm. STATS. § 28-706 (1962);
IDAno CODE § 9-1207 (1948); IN. Buais ANN . ST.
2-1726 (1933); Ky. R. Crv. P. 43.07 (1970); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 45-590 (1953); TXAS, VER'oN's ANN. C.C.P.
art. 38.28 (1935); WYo. STAT. § 1-143 (1957); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 6.035 (1964); WXs. STAT. Am. 885-35 (1957)
(limited to criminal cases).
Total abandonment of the voucher rule is proposed
in UmnoRu RuLrs 63(1); PfopoSED FED. R. or Ev.
607(d) (2).
:5 See, supra n. 17.185 J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1422, at 204 (1940).
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readily lie if to do so would be in the individual's
own worst interest. The second ground lies in the
necessity principle, which makes admissible, due
to the justified unavailability of the declarant,
trustworthy evidence which would otherwise be
lost.y
Not all declarations against interest are admissi-
ble exceptions to the hearsay rule. The leading case
of Donnelly v. United Statesa held that while
declarations against pecuniary and proprietary in-
terests were admissible exceptions to the hearsay
principle, declarations against penal interests were
inadmissible a- hearsay. The Donnelly Court fol-
lowed the British Sussex Peerage Case 9 which simi-
larly held declarations against penal interest inad-
missible "for general caution and care not to extend
the hearsay rule." 30 The Donnelly Court, like the
Sussex court feared a loss in trustworthiness of such
testimony due to their belief that one would be
more likely to lie against penal interests than
against pecuniary or proprietary interests.31
In Chambers, the Court's main concern with the
exception was its trustworthiness. In the circum-
stances of Chambers, the Court, breaking from the
strict Donnelly rule, placed the trustworthiness of
the declarations against penal interest on par with
that of declarations against pecuniary or propri-
etary interests. The Court justified this parity of
trustworthiness because of several facts of the case.
All McDonald's admissions were made to close
friends within a day of the murder. Each admission
was corroborated by other evidence.32 These ad-
2'S J. WIGM oE, Evm~xcE § 1421, at 204 (1940).
228 U.S. 243, 272-73 (1913).
29 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844). In this case, George I
tried to show the lawfulness of his parents' marriage
by the admission of a deceased minister's declaration
that he married the couple in a Roman Catholic church.
Such a marriage was a felony at the time, making the
declaration against the minister's penal interests.30 Id. at 1045.
31Justice Holmes, joined by Justices Hughes and
Lurton, dissented in Donnelly, arguing that no earlier
Supreme Court case compelled such a decision. The
dissenters considered the general declaration against
interest exception well-taken. However, they con-
sidered it contrary to common sense to give declara-
tions against penal interests less weight than that of
pecuniary or proprietary interests. 228 U.S. at 277-78.
5 J. WXmuoRE, EvmExcE § 1476-1477, at 281-90
(1940), described the Sussex case as poorly argued and
against all past precedent. Wigmore further discredited
Sussex because it absurdly and indiscriminately re-jected all declarations against penal interest.
12 The corroborating evidence included McDonald's
sworn confession; testimony of an eyewitness to the
shooting; testimony of another eyewitness that Mc-
Donald held a gun after the shooting and proof that
McDonald previously owned the type of gun used in
the murder. 410 U.S. at 300.
missions were obviously against McDonald's in-
terests, as McDonald had nothing to gain by
them." Finally, if there were questions as to the
validity of such declarations, McDonald was in the
courtroom and was under oath.4
In its disapproval of the inadmissibility of dec-
larations against penal interests under the circum-
stances of this case, the Court followed the lead of
numerous statutes,35 court decisions, 8 and com-
mentatorsn which also disapproved or modified the
common law rule. The Court, giving great weight
to the trustworthiness of the declarations against
penal interest in Chambers, dispensed with the re-
quirement that the declarant be unavailable. This
requirement was previously necessary to the admis-
sibility of any declaration against interest. The una-
vailability of the dedarant as a prerequisite for use
"In establishing the Mississippi rule of inadmissi-
bility of declarations against penal interest, Brown v.
State, 99 Miss. 719, 55 So. 2d 961 (1911), is distin-
guishable from Chambers' case. In Brown, the de-
clarant was motivated in his admission to save his own
brother. In Chambers, McDonald had no such impetus.
410 U.S. at 300-01 n.20.
34 This point is also distinguishable from Donnelly
and Brown in which the declarant was unavailable at
the trial. 410 U.S. at 300-01 n.20.
11 For statutes holding the unavailability of the
declarant unnecessary, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
84 A, Rule 63 (10) (Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN.
60-4600) (1964); V.I. CODE ANN. § 932 (10) (1967);
C. Z. CoDE 5, 2962 (10) (1962); UNiomM Rutrxs or
EvDmENc 63(10) (1953); A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF
EvmEcE, Rule 509 (1942); PROPosED FED. R. or Ev.
8-04(b) (4) (1969). For one holding the unavailability
of the declarant necessary, see CAL. EviD. CODE § 1230r
(West 1965).
31See, e.g., People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389
P.2d 377 (1964) (Traynor, J.). The testimony of a non-
party to have possessed heroin for which Spriggs was
tried was admissible because 1) declarations against
penal interest are no less trustworthy than proprietary
and pecuniary declarations; 2) penal consequences are
an adequate deterrent to assure trustworthiness; 3)
convictions mean economic loss, so such declarations
against penal interset mean pecuniary loss. Although
unavailability is unnecessary here, the codification
made it necessary. See CAL Evw. CODE § 1230 (West
1965).
See also Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148
(1926) (The testimony of an oral declaration of guilt
by one not party to bastardy prosecution, later com-
mitting suicide, was admissible); State v. Sejuelas, 94
N.J. Super. 576, 229 A. 2d 659 (1967) (The New Jersey
statute admitting declarations against penal interest
was upheld); People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257
N.E.2d 16 (1970) (Declarations against penal interest
are admissible if material and the person making the
statement is unavailable); Newberry v. Common-
wealth, 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E.2d 318 (Ct. of App. 1950
(The testimony concerning the declaration by one ad-
mitting a murder for which his brother was tried was
admissible).
375 J. WIGMORE, EvmENcE §§ 1476-77, at 281-90
(1940).
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of the exception was recommended by Wigmore
and is required by a significant minority of cases
and statutes. 9 Viewing availability of the declarant
as a cross-check against any alleged untruthfulness
of witnesses, the Chambers Court necessarily re-
jected the rationale requiring unavailability. 0 The
requirement that the declarant be unavailable was
premised on the assumption that if such trust-
worthy evidence existed and the declarant was
available to testify at trial, testimony by a third
party as to the declaration would be too remote.
If, however, the declarant was unavailable, it
would necessarily be in the best interests of justice
to admit the testimony of a third person which
otherwise would be lost. The Chambers Court felt
it important to have no requirement as to the
availability of the declarant binding the evidentiary
process. Since the declarant was available in Cham-
bers, the trier of fact could weigh different accounts
of an alleged declaration. If the declarant were
unavailable, the declaration would still be admissi-
ble.
In a concurring opinion, Justice White dealt with
the question of the Court's jurisdiction in a differ-
ent manner. Justice White conceded that if the
highest state court failed to pass on a question, the
Supreme Court would presume this silence was due
to improper presentation before the state courtsA'
However, Justice White recognized that on occa-
sion, the Court would investigate state law to de-
termine if a federal question, to which the state
supreme court was silent, was properly raised
under state procedure. This investigation would be
most appropriate here, because the state conceded
the Court's jurisdiction and that the issues were
properly raised in state courts.
Justice White pointed to Mississippi cases where
the contemporaneous objection rule was not en-
forced and where the Mississippi supreme court
considered an issue for the first time.C Such cases
were exceptions because fundamental constitu-
tional rights were involved. Henry v. JlfississippiO
construed this contemporaneous objection rule
35 J. WiGmoRE, EvmENcE § 1421, at 204 (Chad-
bourn ed. 1970).
39 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 26 N.Y. 88, 257 N.E.2d
16 (1970); CAL. Evin. CoDE § 1230 (West 1965);
PRoPosED FED. R. or Ev. 8-04(b)(4).
40 410 U.S. at 301.
41410 U.S. at 303-04, citing Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 582 (1969).
40 410 U.S. at 304-05, citing Carter v. State, 198
Miss. 523, 21 So. 2d 404 (1945); Brooks v. State,
209 Miss. 150, 46 So. 2d 94 (1950).
"379 U.S. 443 (1965).
strictly, but on remand, the Mississippi supreme
court interpreted it to be flexible enough so that
despite its non-compliance, a Mississippi appellate
court could review the issue "to enforce constitu-
tional rights in the interest of justice." ' Thus,
much of the pre-Henry exception to protect funda-
mental constitutional rights was preserved. 45
Therefore, Justice White allowed jurisdiction as
Chambers' fundamental constitutional challenge
to the trial court's evidentiary rulings was properly
made to the Mississippi supreme court and the
state did not contend the issue was not properly
considered by the Mississippi high court.
Justice Rehnquist dissented because he did not
think the Court had jurisdiction." Justice Rehn-
quist cited Street v. New York 7 which demanded
that a federal claim "be brought to the attention of
the state court with fair precision and in due
time." 43 According to Justice Rehnquist, Cham-
bers, by making his constitutional evidentiary ob-
jections at motion for retrial, did not object to the
constitutional issue in due time. This tardiness of
objection denied the court "the opportunity to
reconsider ... [Chambers'] evidentiary ruling in
the light of the constitutional objection." 9 Such
an opportunity for the trial court was a valid state
interest.50 To object timely to the ruling, but in
non-constitutional terms, did not satisfy the con-
temporaneous objection rule.5 Unlike the majority,
Justice Rehnquist did not consider Chambers' con-
stitutional objection to be the cumulative sum of
the trial court's rulings, which could only have
been totaled up and presented after the formal
trial. Assuming such an objection was made in due
time, Chambers' broad assertion of unfairness un-
4 Henry v. State, 253 Miss. 263, 287, 174 So. 2d
348, 351 (1965).
46See Wood v. State, 257 So. 2d 193, 200 (Miss.
1972) (The Mississippi supreme court considered the
constitutional question of unfair state cross-examination
despite the failure to object at trial); King v. State,
230 So. 2d 209, 211 (Miss. 1970) (A request for a
peremptory instruction was allowed despite the failure
to object at trial to alleged illegally obtained evidence).
46410 U.S. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As to
the merits, justice Rehnquist related, "I would have
considerable difficulty in subscribing to the Court's
further constitutionalization of the intricacies of the
common law of evidence."
47394 U.S. 576 (1969).
' Id. at 582.
49 410 U.S. at 310.
0 Id., citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443,
448 (1965).51 A post-trial objection on constitutional grounds
to a condemnation award was ruled not timely as the
objection made at trial was made on non-constitutional
grounds in Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203 (1945).
